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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
A METHOD AND TOOL FOR FINDING CONCURRENCY BUGS INVOLVING
MULTIPLE VARIABLES WITH APPLICATION TO MODERN DISTRIBUTED
SYSTEMS
by
Zhuo Sun
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Xudong He, Major Professor
Concurrency bugs are extremely hard to detect due to huge interleaving space.
They are happening in the real world more often because of the prevalence of multi-
threaded programs taking advantage of multi-core hardware, and microservice based
distributed systems moving more and more applications to the cloud. As the most
common non-deadlock concurrency bugs, atomicity violations are studied in many
recent works, however, those methods are applicable only to single-variable atomicity
violation, and don't consider the speciﬁc challenge in distributed systems that have
both pessimistic and optimistic concurrency control.
This dissertation presents a tool using model checking to predict atomicity vi-
olation concurrency bugs involving two shared variables or shared resources. We
developed a unique method inferring correlation between shared variables in multi-
threaded programs and shared resources in microservice based distributed systems,
that is based on dynamic analysis and is able to detect the correlation that would
be missed by static analysis. For multi-threaded programs, we use a binary instru-
mentation tool to capture runtime information about shared variables and synchro-
nization events, and for microservice based distributed systems, we use a web proxy
to capture HTTP based traﬃc about API calls and the shared resources they access
vi
including distributed locks. Based on the detected correlation and runtime trace,
the tool is powerful and can explore a vast interleaving space of a multi-threaded
program or a microservice based distributed system given a small set of captured
test runs. It is applicable to large real-world systems and can predict atomicity vi-
olations missed by other related works for multi-threaded programs and a couple of
previous unknown atomicity violation in real world open source microservice based
systems. A limitation is that redundant model checking may be performed if two
recorded interleaved traces yield the same partial order model.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend, for both high performance servers
and low power mobile devices. Multi-threaded programs can exploit multi-core
processors at their full potential. In the real world, most servers and high-end
critical software are multi-threaded. Unfortunately, multi-threaded programs are
prone to bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by concurrency. It is diﬃcult
to detect concurrency bugs due to the huge number of possible interleavings. Many
concurrency bugs escape from testing into software releases and cause some of the
most serious computer-related accidents in history, including a blackout leaving tens
of millions of people without electricity [1].
Among diﬀerent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most
common ones. Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity of
certain code regions without proper synchronization. They widely exist in real world
systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock concurrency
bugs [2]. Therefore, techniques for detecting atomicity violation bugs are extremely
important.
Studies in recent years have been focusing on single-variable atomicity violation.
However, those methods are unable to predict or ﬁnd atomicity violations with
multiple variables involved. Many variables are inherently correlated and need to
be accessed together with their correlated peers in a consistent manner [3]. These
variables need to be either updated together or accessed together to avoid multi-
variable atomicity violation.
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Beyond the concurrency bugs in multi-threaded systems, there are concurrency
bugs in distributed systems. With more and more large-scale distributed systems,
there are billions of end users relying on the correctness of the distributed systems.
More than 60% of distributed concurrency bugs are triggered by a single untimely
message delivery that commits order violation or atomicity violation [4].
1.2 Research Problem
Atomicity is a semantic correctness property for concurrent programs. When proper
synchronization is missing to enforce atomicity, atomicity violation bugs may occur,
also known as unserializable interleavings that are not equivalent to a serial exe-
cution. For the case with a single shared variable involved, whether a two-thread
interleaving is equivalent to a serial execution can be determined by checking if its
conﬂict graph is acyclic [5].
Most concurrency bugs involve two threads, instead of a large number of threads,
based on the study in [6], in which 101 out of 105 bugs involved only two threads.
Thus atomicity violation bugs in a multi-threaded program can be explored through
every pair of threads. McPatom [7] is inspired by the works in [2][8], which addressed
a special case of unserializable interleavings with three accesses of the same shared
variable.
Existing atomicity violation detection tools mostly focus on the bugs that have
a single variable involved. The tools study the accesses to the same shared variable.
But the atomicity violation bugs caused by unserializable accesses to multiple shared
variables actually contribute signiﬁcantly to the existing known ones [3].
Multiple variable atomicity can be achieved by ensuring the atomicity of each
pair of shared variables. So in the sequel, we focus on two-variable atomicity. For
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the case with two shared variables involved, a method is desired to check if the
two variables are correlated and determine whether a two-thread interleaving is
equivalent to a serial execution, that is the problem to discuss in this work.
Predicting atomicity violation for distributed system is also challenging due to its
complex non-deterministic nature that involve single resource or multiple resources,
and the existence of both pessimistic and optimistic concurrency control.
1.3 Contributions
The typical software development process relies on software testing for quality as-
surance, but testing cannot ensure every possible scenario is covered. In concurrent
systems, it is even more diﬃcult if not impossible to test every feasible thread inter-
leavings due to non-determinism, making concurrency bugs the most troublesome
in all types of software bugs. This frustrates both testing and reproduction for bug
diagnosis. Many variables are inherently correlated and need to be accessed together
with their correlated peers in a consistent manner [3], that makes it even more chal-
lenging when the correlated variables are involved in an atomicity violation. Tools
to automatically predict multi-variable atomicity violation would save cost in soft-
ware testing, and even more by avoiding it in production. This dissertation predicts
a class of atomicity violation that the existing tools are not able to detect. The
contribution of this work is as follows:
1. This dissertation presents a method to infer access correlation from an instru-
mented interleaved trace that only records events related to atomicity viola-
tions. Such an interleaved trace is much smaller than the program behavior in
a complete execution. Furthermore, the extracted model and inferred access
correlation enable the checking of all alternative traces with the same causal
3
relationships as the interleaved trace with multiple variables or multiple re-
sources involved.
2. This dissertation proposes a complete set of the patterns of unserializable in-
terleavings involving two threads or processes (most concurrency bugs involve
only two threads [6]) containing any number of accesses to multiple shared
variable or resources. These patterns generalize and cover the three accesses
proposed in [2][8]. These atomicity violation patterns become property speci-
ﬁcations to be checked.
3. This dissertation oﬀers a unique prediction tool, for detecting multi-variable
atomicity violation bugs through model checking for both multi-threaded pro-
grams and microservice based distributed systems.
4. This dissertation reports a couple of previous unknown atomicity violations in
real world open source microservice based systems.
1.4 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses
the background and how it is related to this work. Chapter 3 presents our work
in predicting multi-variable atomicity violations, based on access correlation be-
tween variables and atomicity violation pattern of variable accesses. Chapter 4
discusses atomicity violations in microservice based distributed systems and the
methods to predict atomicity violations, by applying what was learned from Chap-
ter 3 and studying the diﬀerence in distributed systems while there are similarities
between protecting shared variables in multi-threaded programs and shared data in
distributed systems that run on multiple processes or multiple machines. Chapter
5 concludes the work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter discusses the background related to the research work in this dis-
sertation. Model checking is a method for formally verifying ﬁnite-state concurrent
systems against the speciﬁcations of the systems which are expressed as temporal
logic formulas. Eﬃcient symbolic algorithms are developed to traverse the model of
the system and check if the speciﬁcation of the system holds or not.
2.1 Linear Time Temporal Logic
Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL) formula, proposed in [9], can be used to express
both safety and liveness properties, by encoding about the future of paths. Linear
Temporal Logic is an inﬁnite sequence of states where each state in time has a
unique successor based on a linear time perspective. A system satisﬁes the LTL
formula if and only if the formula holds for all paths of the system. An LTL formula
f may contain any lowercase propositional symbol p from a ﬁnite set of propositions
P , combined with unary or binary, boolean and/or temporal operators, using the
grammar shown in the Formula 2.1, Formula 2.2 and Formula 2.3 [10].
f ::=p (2.1)
|true
|false
|(f)
|f binop f
|unop f
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unop ::= (always) (2.2)
|♦ (eventually)
|! (logic negation)
binop ::=U (strong until) (2.3)
|X (next)
|&& (logical and)
||| (logical or)
| ⇒ (implication)
| ⇔ (equivalence)
Figure 2.1 illustrates the intuition behind the main LTL operators in the Formula
2.1. An interpretation for a LTL formula is an inﬁnite word ξ = x0x1... over the
alphabet 2P , i.e. a mapping from the naturals to 2P [11]. The elements of 2P are
interpreted as assigning truth values to the elements of P : elements in the set are
assigned true, elements not in the set are assigned false. We write ξi for the suﬃx
of ξ starting at xi. The semantics of LTL is then shown in the following.
1. ξ |= q iﬀ q ∈ x0, for q ∈ P , that means q holds at the current state.
2. ξ |= ¬ϕ iﬀ not ξ |= ϕ, that means ϕ doesn't hold at the current state.
3. ξ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ ξ |= ϕ and ξ |= ψ, that means both ϕ and ψ hold at the current
state.
4. ξ |= ϕ ∨ ψ iﬀ ξ |= ϕ or ξ |= ψ, that means either ϕ or ψ hold at the current
state.
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5. ξ |= Xϕ iﬀ ξ1 |= ϕ, that means ϕ holds at the next state.
6. ξ |= ϕ ∪ ψ iﬀ there is an i ≥ 0 such that ξi |= ψ and ξj |= ϕ for all 0 ≤ j < i,
that means ϕ holds at least until ψ which holds at the current or a future
state.
7. ξ |= ϕ iﬀ ξi |= ϕ for all i ≥ 0, that means ϕ holds at the entire subsequent
path,
8. ξ |= ♦ϕ iﬀ there is an i ≥ 0 such that ξi |= ϕ, that means ϕ eventually holds
at a state in the subsequent path,
LTL formulas can specify both safety and liveness, where safety means something
bad will never happen and liveness means something good will happen. For
example, no violation of mutual exclusion is a safety property, can be speciﬁed as
(¬inCSA ∨ ¬inCSB) for a pair of threads A and B where inCS means in critical
sections. And starvation freedom is an example of livenss, whenever process A
wants to enter the critical section, provided process B never stays in the critical
section forever, A gets to enter eventually. Starvation freedom can be speciﬁed as
♦(B = InCS ⇒ X(B = OutCS))⇒ (A = RequestCS ⇒ ♦(A = InCS)).
2.2 Model Checking
Almost all computing systems involve asynchronous concurrency, in the form of
threads or message passing. The design and analysis of concurrent systems has
proved to be one of the most vexing practical problems in computer science [12].
The diﬃculty is largely caused by the interleavings problem. That is, the developer
of a concurrent system faces with the huge number of possible orderings of actions
that can be generated by independent processes or threads, which causes errors
7
Figure 2.1: Intuition for the main LTL operators
that are hard to reproduce. The errors might not manifest frequently but they
make systems unacceptably unreliable. Model checking is one possible solution to
the problem.
Edmund M. Clarke deﬁnes model checking as follows in the book [13]. Let AP
be a set of atomic propositions. A Kripke structure M over AP is a four tuple
M = (S, S0, R, L) where
1. S is a ﬁnite set of states.
2. S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states, and can be omitted when we are not
concerned with the set of initial states S0.
3. R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation that must be total, that is, for every state
s ∈ S there is a state s′ ∈ S such that R(s, s′).
4. L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic
propositions true in that state.
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Given a Kripke structure M = (S,R, L) that represents a ﬁnite-state concur-
rent system and a temporal logic formula f expressing some desired speciﬁcation,
the model checking problem is to ﬁnd the set of all states in S that satisfy f :
{s ∈ S | M, s |= f}
Ken McMillan deﬁned the model checking in the foreword of [12]:Model checking
is a fully automated veriﬁcation technique that constructs a graph representing all
possible states of the system and the transitions between them. This state graph
can be thought of as a ﬁnite folding of an inﬁnite computation tree containing all
possible executions of the system. Using the state graph, we can deﬁnitively answer
questions about the system's behavior posed in temporal logic, a specialized notation
for specifying systems that evolve in time.
Unfortunately, because the computation tree explicitly represents all possible
interleavings of concurrent executions, the size of the state graph is huge even for
simple systems, that is the well known state explosion problem [14]. Partial order
methods have been proposed and developed to address the state explosion problems
in many research works, such as [15][16] and unfolding approaches [17] [12]. What's
more, [18] combines the partial order methods with on-the-ﬂy model checking [19,
20].
In this dissertation based on traces of accesses of shared variable or resources,
although the total number of possible interleavings to check can explode quickly as
the number of accesses increase, however, the number of actual interleavings are
drastically smaller due to the constraints imposed by happen-before relationships
between threads. Another way to vastly reduce the possible interleavings is to reduce
number of variables to check, in this dissertation we take advantage of the nature of
atomicity violations and considers only a pair of threads or processes and accesses
to a single or two shared variables or resources at one time, groups all reading
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event sequences in each thread or process into atomic blocks to achieve partial order
reductions.
2.3 Spin Model Checker
Spin model checker [10] uses the combination of partial order methods with on-
the-ﬂy model checking [18] to reduce the number of reachable states that must be
explored to complete a veriﬁcation.
SPIN takes design speciﬁcations written in the veriﬁcation language Promela
(a Process Meta Language) [21] as models to check, and it takes correctness claims
speciﬁed in the syntax of standard Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [9] as the properties
to verify. The speciﬁcation of a concurrent system in PROMELA consists of one
or more user-deﬁned process templates, or proctype deﬁnitions, and at least one
process instantiation, in which the process can represent threads in multi-threaded
programs or machines in distributed systems. The process templates deﬁne the
behavior of processes.
In Promela programs, (1) the execution of every statement is conditional on its
executability. Statements are either executable or blocked. The executability is
the basic means of synchronization. A process can wait for an event to happen by
waiting for a statement to become executable. A condition can only be executed
(passed) when it holds. If the condition does not hold, execution blocks until it
does. (2) Variables are used to store either global information about the system as
a whole, or information local to one speciﬁc process, depending on where the decla-
ration for the variable is placed. Variables can be declared as arrays, for example,
short locked[N ] declares an array of N short. (3) The state of a variable can only be
changed or inspected by processes. The behavior of a process is deﬁned in a proc-
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type declaration. (4) A proctype deﬁnition only declares process behavior, it does
not execute it. Initially just one process will be executed: a process of type init, that
must be declared explicitly in every Promela speciﬁcation, to instantiate processes.
(5) By preﬁxing a sequence of statements enclosed in curly braces with the keyword
atomic it is indicated that the sequence is to be executed as one indivisible unit,
non-interleaved with any other processes. (6) The selection structure using keyword
if and fi contains multiple execution sequences, each preceded by a double colon.
Only one sequence from the list will be executed. A sequence can be selected only
if its ﬁrst statement is executable. The ﬁrst statement is therefore called a guard.
If more than one guard is executable, one of the corresponding sequences is selected
nondeterministically. If all guards are unexecutable the process will block until at
least one of them can be selected.
In this dissertation we automatically generate Promela code for all synchroniza-
tion primitives [7]. We present Promela code for mutex locks as an example. We
model synchronization events to capture the happen-before relationships between
threads, to prune infeasible interleavings. The Promela code shown in Figure 2.2
models the POSIX Thread routines pthread_mutex_lock and pthread_mutex_unlock.
The atomic construct groups indivisible statements together to ensure no interleav-
ing within an atomic sequence. Lock inline function accepts a lock l as its argument.
If lock l is not locked, Lock function locks it and sets the owner to the thread that
is the predeﬁned variable _pid for the executing process in Promela. If lock l is in
locked status, no guards are executable so that the thread is blocked until lock l is
available according to Promela semantics. Unlock inline function simply sets lock
l to unlocked status. It is exactly what is required to model locking and unlocking
of a mutex lock. Figure 2.3 gives an example of proctype that is used to simulate a
thread or a process.
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Figure 2.2: Promela Code Modeling Mutex Locks
#define NUM_LOCKS 100
short locked[NUM_LOCKS] = -1;
inline Lock(l) {
if
:: atomic {( locked[l] == -1) -> locked[l] = _pid}
fi;
}
inline Unlock(l) {
assert(locked[l] == _pid);
locked[l] = -1;
}
Figure 2.3: A Sample of Partial Promela Code
proctype t1()
{
...
}
proctype t2()
{
...
}
init
{
run t1();
run t2();
...
}
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SPIN essentially is a model checker generator. It takes models in PROMELA
and properties in LTL as inputs to generate a model checker, the generated model
checker search through the states to give counter examples for the LTL properties.
The counter examples can be used to drive simulation and presentation, in the
context of this dissertation, of predicted atomicity violation as shown in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4.
2.4 High Level Petri Nets
Petri nets, developed in early 1960s by Carl Adam Petri, are a data driven for-
mal model for modeling the control structure and dependency of concurrent and
distributed systems [22]. A Petri net is deﬁned by a net structure N = (P, T, F ),
where P is a ﬁnite set of places represented by circles, T is a ﬁnite set of transitions
represented by bars or boxes and F is the set of directed arcs F ⊆ P × T ∪ T ×P .
Places represent system states; transitions represent state transitions; and directed
arcs represent the control ﬂows and dependencies between states.
High level Petri nets (HLPNs) generalize the original Petri nets with data deﬁ-
nition and processing capabilities: (1) each place needs to have a data type from a
domain of Types, (2) each arc needs to have a label from a domain of Labels, (3)
each transition needs to have a logic formula from a domain of Formulas deﬁning
the precondition and post-condition of a transition ﬁring, and (4) each place is empty
or contain some initial tokens from a domain of Tokens as initial states. The above
static semantic domains are traditionally deﬁned using an algebraic speciﬁcation
Σ = (S,Op,Eq) with a family of sorts (types) S and the associated operations Op,
and a set of equations Eq deﬁning the meaning of the operations. In the context of
this dissertation we use a simpliﬁed deﬁnition of a type of HLPNs called predicate
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transition (PrT) nets [23]. The static semantics of a PrT net is deﬁned using the
following mappings:
1. ϕ : P → Types associates each place p in P with a type in Types. In a PrT
net, places are often called predicates to highlight their roles as in predicate
logic.
2. L : F → Labels is a sort-respecting labeling of arcs. We use the following
abbreviation in the sequel: L¯(x, y) = L(x, y) if (x, y) ∈ F, or Ø otherwise;
3. R : T → Formulas is a well-deﬁned constraining mapping, which associates
each transition t in T with a ﬁrst order logic formula deﬁning the meaning of
the transition.
4. M0 : P → Tokens is a sort-respecting initial marking which assigns a set of
tokens to each place p in P .
Based on the above deﬁnitions, a PrT net is deﬁned as PN = (P, T, F,Σ, ϕ, L,R,M0).
A PrT net is executable and its dynamic semantics is deﬁned on markings and tran-
sition ﬁrings. Markings of a PrT net PN are mappings M : P → Tokens and
denotes the states of PN . Given a markingM , a transition t ∈ T is enabled if there
is a token substitution α of variables on the incoming arcs and in the constraint for-
mula satisfying: ∀p : p ∈ P.(L¯(p, t) : α) ⊆ M(p)) ∧ R(t) : α. An enabled transition
t under marking M with substitution α can ﬁre and results in a new marking M ′
deﬁned by M ′(p) = M(p)− L¯(p, t) : α for p ∈ P , which is denoted as M [t/α > M ′.
As in low level Petri nets, two enabled transitions may ﬁre at the same time as long
as they are not in conﬂict by ﬁring one transition disable another transition. An
execution sequence, E = M0[t0/α0 > M1[t1/α1 > ... > Mn[tn/αn > ..., of PN starts
from the initial marking and contains successive execution steps Ti of non-conﬂict
transition ﬁrings. The behavior of PN is the set of all E.
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Taking dining philosophers problem as an example, Figure 2.4 shows a PrT net
speciﬁcation. Two philosopher states are denoted by places Thinking and Eating
respectively, two philosopher actions are denoted by two transitions Pickup and
Putdown, and the available chopstick state are deﬁned by the place Chopstick.
The PrT net deﬁnition is as follows: (1) Place Types: ϕ(Thinking) = PHIL,
ϕ(Eating) = PHIL × CHOP × CHOP , ϕ(Chopstick) = CHOP , where types
PHIL and CHOP are induced from integers. (2) Arc Labels: L(Thinking, Putdown
) = ph, and the rest are similar as shown in Figure 2.4. (3) Transition Con-
straints: R(Pickup) = (ch1 = ph) ∧ (ch2 = ph ⊕ 1), R(Putdown) = true where
⊕ is modulus k addition. (4) Initial Marking: M0 = {mk|k = 2, 3, ...} where
mk(Thinking) = {1, 2, ...k} andmk(Eating) = ∅ andmk(Chopstick) = {1, 2, ..., k}.
Since Petri net is very well suited to model the message passing, shared data and
distributed locks that are all we need to analyze atomicity violation in distributed
systems, this disseration automatically build Petri net models for predicted atomic-
ity violations in distributed systems to help manually conﬁrming them being a false
positive or not.
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Figure 2.4: Dining Philosophers Problem in PrT nets
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CHAPTER 3
PREDICTING MULTI-VARIABLE ATOMICITY VIOLATION
3.1 Introduction
Multi-core hardware is a growing industry trend, for both high performance servers
and low power mobile devices. Multi-threaded programs can exploit multi-core
processors at their full potential. In the real world, most servers and high-end
critical software are multi-threaded. Unfortunately, multi-threaded programs are
prone to bugs due to the inherent complexity caused by concurrency. It is diﬃcult
to detect concurrency bugs due to the huge number of possible interleavings. Many
concurrency bugs escape from testing into software releases and cause some of the
most serious computer-related accidents in history, including a blackout leaving tens
of millions of people without electricity [1].
Among diﬀerent types of concurrency bugs, atomicity violation bugs are the most
common ones. Atomicity violation bugs are caused by violations to the atomicity
of certain code regions without proper synchronization. They widely exist in the
real world systems and contributed to about 70% of the examined non-deadlock
concurrency bugs according to a research in the year 2006 [2]. Therefore, techniques
for detecting atomicity violation bugs are extremely important.
The studies in recent years have been focused on single-variable atomicity viola-
tion. However, those methods are unable to predict or ﬁnd atomicity violations with
multiple variables involved. Many variables are inherently correlated and need to be
accessed together with their correlated peers in a consistent manner [3]. These vari-
ables need to be either updated together or accessed together to avoid two-variable
atomicity violation.
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This chapter presents a method for predicting two-variable atomicity violation,
based on access correlation between variables and atomicity violation pattern of
variable accesses and in this chapter we make the following contributions [24]:
1. A method to infer access correlation from an instrumented interleaved trace
that only records events related to atomicity violations. Such an interleaved
trace is much smaller than the program behavior in a complete execution.
Furthermore the extracted thread model and inferred access correlation enable
the checking of all alternative traces with the same causal relationships as the
interleaved trace with multiple variables involved.
2. A complete set of the patterns of unserializable interleavings involving two
threads (most concurrency bugs involve only two threads [6]) containing any
number of accesses to multiple shared variable (either user-deﬁned or ev-
ery word sized dynamically allocated memory accessed by multiple threads).
These patterns generalize and cover the three accesses proposed in [2][8]. These
atomicity violation patterns become property speciﬁcations to be checked.
3. A unique prediction tool - McPatom-MV, for detecting two-variable atomicity
violation bugs through model checking.
3.2 Motivation
Multiple variable atomicity can be achieved by ensuring the atomicity of each pair
of shared variables. So in the sequel, we focus on two-variable atomicity.
Existing atomicity violation detection tools mostly focus on the bugs that have
a single variable involved. The tools study the accesses to the same shared variable.
But the atomicity violation bugs caused by unserializable accesses to multiple shared
variables actually contribute signiﬁcantly to the existing known ones [3]. There are
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Figure 3.1: Mozilla bug 1
a few well known two-variable atomicity violations. In the sequel, we use real-world
examples [3] to show what could be atomicity violation bugs in the real world, and
also one of the most challenging ones to show the beneﬁt of our methods against
the existing tools.
Figure 3.1 shows an example from Mozilla-0.8, each single shared variable is
synchronized properly by using the lock so that there is no data race and no single
variable atomicity violation. However, the two variables table and empty as part
of the same structure cache are correlated by its nature, empty is used to indicate
whether table is empty or not so that the two variables have to be updated together.
In the interleaved execution as shown in Figure 3.1, they are not updated together
though, which ends up with table being empty but with the variable empty being
false that indicates table is not empty.
Figure 3.2 gives an example from Mozilla-0.9, the two variables totalStrings
and lengthSum are part of the same structure rt, and are correlated to each other.
The interleaved execution as shown in the ﬁgure is a violation of atomicity in terms
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Figure 3.2: Mozilla bug 2
of two variables because it reads an intermediate value and results in inconsistent
values between the variables.
In the examples discussed above, the correlated variables are accessed in adjacent
statements, however, with complicated cases, the statements can be encapsulated
into diﬀerent functions so that the statements are not adjacent to each other any
more but their access to the correlated variables will be next or very close to each
other in the sequence of statements during runtime. Static source code analysis
methods can identify such correlation across functions by analyzing the function
call graph, but is unable to guarantee to ﬁnd all such cases due to its limitation of
static analysis. Analyzing the correlation based on dynamic runtime traces makes it
easier to analyze such correlation because it does not have to analyze the call graph.
It can ﬁnd such correlation as long as it manifests in the traced execution. It has
an assumption though, the correlated variables need to be accessed in the sample
runnings which should be able to cover most cases with good suits of test cases. The
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Figure 3.3: MySQL bug
runtime method can complement static methods and has the beneﬁt that it won't
miss the common cases.
Figure 3.3 shows an example from MySQL that separate our method from other
similar methods in the related works. It may cause failure of database recovery -
table t has one row as in the interleaving in the ﬁgure but it will have no row during
database recovery due to the sequence of INSERT then DELETE in database
log.
Our method based on dynamic execution traces is able to detect it as discussed
in the following.
3.3 Predicting Single Variable Atomicity Violation
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the tool McPatom as in [7], which is generalized
in this paper to support two-variable atomicity violation.
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3.3.1 Description of the Partial Order Thread Model
A multi-threaded program runs with multiple threads and variables. The access to
local variables has no impact to concurrency, thus not be able to cause concurrency
bugs. The variables allocated dynamically in the heap can be potentially accessed
by multiple threads, can be involved in concurrency bugs. Those variables can be
potentially involved in concurrency bugs are deﬁned as shared variables, that are
addresses of global variables and every word sized dynamically allocated memory
accessed by multiple threads. The same memory address does not necessarily mean
the same variable though since it can be reused through the memory management
functions, so memory allocation and deallocation instructions are also monitored in
order to diﬀerentiate the variables in case the same memory address is reused.
For a multi-threaded program P , an execution σ = s1, ..., sn of is a sequence of
executed statements. An execution can be projected to a sequence of annotated
shared variable accesses and synchronization events, which is the trace to analyze
in this work. Formally, a trace, τ = e1, ..., em is a sequence of events where each
event ei(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a tuple 〈tidi, timestampi, actioni〉 in which tidi is a thread
handle, timestampi is a time stamp based on real time and actioni is one of the
following: (read/write/allocate/deallocate, a shared variable), (a synchronization
routine, a synchronization variable) or (a thread management operation, a thread
handle). McPatom uses POSIX Threads in which a synchronization routine is a
routine related to semaphores, mutex locks, condition variables and barriers, does
not handle user-deﬁned synchronization primitives. McPatom also assumes a shared
variable as a synchronization variable if it is accessed by synchronization routines,
thus does not treat its accesses as shared variable accesses.
22
Given a trace τ = e1, ..., em containing shared variable accesses and syn-
chronization events, a partial order thread model (Eτ ,≺) is deﬁned as
follows:
1. Eτ = {ei | ei in τ}
(a) ≺ is a partial order relation such that, for any ei, ej ∈ E (i 6= j), ei ≺ ej
iﬀ
i. tidi = tidj and i < j, or
ii. tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Signal, cvar), actionj = (Wait, cvar) and
∀k  ((j < k < i) ∧ (actionk 6= (Signal, cvar)) in which cvar is a
condition variable, or
iii. tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Wait, bvar) and (i < j) ∧ ∃k  ((tidk = tidj) ∧
(k < j) ∧ actionk = (Wait, bvar) ∧ ∀h  ((tidh = tidk) ⇒ ¬(k < h <
j))) in which bvar is a barrier variable, or
iv. tidi 6= tidj, actioni = (Create, tidj), or
v. tidi 6= tidj, actionj = (Join, tidi).
(b) Mutual exclusion: for any ei, ej, em, en ∈ E (i 6= j 6= m 6= n), ej ≺ em or
en ≺ ei iﬀ
i. tidi = tidj, actioni = (Lock, lvar), actionj = (Unlock, lvar), and
ii. tidm = tidn, actionm = (Lock, lvar), actionn = (Unlock, lvar).
The partial order above deﬁnes the causal relation and is similar to the happened-
before relation given in [25]. The above deﬁnition ensures (1) shared variable ac-
cesses within the same thread are ordered, and (2) the constraint of synchronization
is preserved regarding its impact to the shared variable accesses across multiple
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threads. Therefore, it captures alternative traces that obey the same causal rela-
tion as τ and thus equivalent to the original trace, and each alternative trace τ ′
is a result of rearranging the order of some shared variable accesses across diﬀer-
ent threads without breaking the constraint by ≺. The partial order thread model
enables exploration of all possible alternative traces that correspond to a set of
feasible interleavings in a multi-threaded program. However, the model provides
an over-approximation without considering data-ﬂow, thus cannot guarantee each
alternative trace captured in the model can be projected back to some feasible in-
terleaved execution in the multi-threaded program P , that is the reason of false
positives.
3.3.2 Implementation of the Partial Order Thread Model
McPatom uses Pin binary instrumentation framework [26] to instrument a running
executable and capture runtime information into a trace, speciﬁcally including, ev-
ery access (read/write/allocate/deallocate) to every shared variable and every syn-
chronization event using POSIX Thread (locks, condition variables, barriers, thread
joining and etc.). For each event in the trace, McPatom also ﬁnds the correspond-
ing source code information including ﬁle name and line number through the debug
information contained in the executable, that can be used to help to locate the
predicted bugs and also to ﬁnd the variable correlation across multiple traces. A
sample of a partial trace is shown in Figure 3.4.
3.3.3 Three-access Atomicity Violation
Many recent works focused on three-access atomicity violations [2][8][6], which in-
volve one shared variable, two threads and three accesses to the variable. If two
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4913812332 , 1515882591 , sample.c-812, Read , threads
4913812332 , 1515882591 , sample.c-126, Create , 4915489248
4915489248 , 1515882591 , sample.c-310, Lock , lockVar
4915489248 , 1515882591 , sample.c-311, Read , sharedVar
4915489248 , 1515882591 , sample.c-311, Write , sharedVar
4915489248 , 1515882591 , sample.c-312, Signal , condVar
4915489248 , 1515882591 , sample.c-313, Unlock , lockVar
Figure 3.4: A Sample of a Partial Trace (The format of each line: thread handle,
unix epoch timestamp, ﬁle name - line number, action)
consecutive accesses of a shared variable in a thread are interleaved with an access
to the same variable from another thread, and the interleaving is unserializable, the
atomicity of the two consecutive accesses is violated and it is a potential atomicity
violation bug. The explanation of unserializable interleavings of three accesses and
many real world atomicity violation bugs can be found in [2]. The related works
above focus on three-access atomicity violations because (1) there are many real
world atomicity violation bugs involving only three accesses, and (2) checking only
three accesses in a pair of threads can greatly reduce the complexity of algorithms.
Deﬁnition 1 (Serializability). A two-thread interleaving is serializable if and only if
it is equivalent to a serial execution, which executes a code region without another
thread interleaved in between. The code region is typically enforced as atomic
explicitly in the code.
Conﬂict graph is used in the context of concurrency control in databases [5]. It
contains 1) a node for each memory access; 2) an arc from node Ai to node Aj if Ai
precedes and conﬂicts with Aj where conﬂicts means at least one of Ai and Aj is a
write.
Deﬁnition 2 (Serializability with single variable). A single-variable two-thread in-
terleaving is equivalent to a serial execution if and only if its conﬂict graph is acyclic
according to the Serializability Theorem [5].
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Figure 3.5: Conﬂict graph for a single-variable two-thread interleaving
Figure 3.6: Unserializable Interleavings with two threads. In (1)(2)(3)(5), W in
Thread 2 unexpectedly changes the value; In (4), An intermediate value in Thread
1 is read by Thread 2.
Figure 3.5 shows two examples of conﬂict graphs for a single-variable two-thread
interleaving, one is cyclic and another is acyclic between two threads. The cyclic
one is unserializable while the acyclic one is serializable.
Figure 3.6 shows all possible scenarios of unserializable interleavings with only
one access from Thread 2. If any of the unserializable interleaving patterns are
matched, it indicates a potential atomicity violation. In the ﬁgure, R+ means one
or more read accesses and R∗ means zero or more read accesses.
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3.4 Variable Correlation Analysis
The discussions in Section 3.2 provides the motivation to predict two-variable atom-
icity violation, and focus on a pair of variables, however, only the variables that are
correlated with each other can potentially cause atomicity violations. Many vari-
ables are inherently correlated and need to be accessed together with their correlated
peers in a consistent manner. A pair of variables need to be accessed together, that
is the atomicity to ensure otherwise there could be atomicity violation.
The correlation is usually in the developer's mind or even not realized by de-
velopers especially for developers maintaining the software or components but not
the original author, so the most important thing to predict atomicity violation bugs
with two-variable involved is to infer the correlation automatically, since it is very
impracticable to expect developers to enforce or somehow mark the correlation be-
tween variables, if not impossible.
Deﬁnition 3 (Variable Correlation). Two variables x and y are correlated if every
time variable x is accessed, variable y is also accessed shortly afterward, formally
denoted as access(x)⇒ access(y).
The important question to answer is how we measure the correlation. There can
be multiple possible ways.
It can be measured in source code distance [3]: if two accesses appear in the
same function with less thanMaxDistance statements apart, these two accesses are
considered together, whereMaxDistance is an adjustable threshold. The limitation
is it assumes all correlated accesses happen in the same function, however, the
correlated accesses can happen in diﬀerent functions that are called in the same
function. The measure in source code distance is not able to cover that problem.
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It can also be measured in dynamic execution distance, that is the distance in the
trace of dynamic execution. The measure is excluded in [3] because it is believed that
two correlated accesses can easily be separated by a loop or a function invocation
and thus have a large dynamic execution trace. We design the trace to be just for
memory accesses of shared variables, that makes dynamic execution distance a good
measure, and avoid the limitation in the measure of source code distance discussed
above.
3.5 Algorithm to Infer Access Correlation from a Single Trace
The trace is a sequence of memory accesses, the idea is to infer access correlation
from their distance in the trace, which indicates the possibility whether any pair of
accesses should be atomic.
We instrument the memory allocation/deallocation instructions to get memory
addresses that should be treated as shared variables. When a memory address is
deallocated and allocated again, we treat it as a separate variable.
3.5.1 Memory Access Correlation Table
For n memory addresses or variables v1...vn, the memory access table is a n × n
matrix C, C = [cxy] where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ n and cxy is calculated as follows for the
correlation between vx and vy. For memory accesses Ai(vx) and Aj(vy) in the trace,
where Ai(vx) is the ith access that read or write the variable vx and Aj(vy) is the
jth access that read or write the variable vy, if there is a sequence AiAk...AmAj ,
suppose the memory accesses from Ak to Am access variables other than vx and vy
and j ≥ i + 1, add the distance j − i − 1 to a list of distances dxy. After getting
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distances of all pairs of vx and vy added into the list dxy, we can calculate cxy based
on dxy.
In the list of distances dxy, there could be shorter ones and longer ones in which
there could be a presence of outliers. One of the common ways of ﬁnding outliers in
a list is to mark any point that is more than two standard deviations from the mean
as a potential outlier. But the presence of outliers could have a strong eﬀect on
the mean and the standard deviation, making those ways unreliable to ﬁnd outliers.
Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) [27] proposes to use absolute deviation around
the median as a way of dealing with the problem of outliers. We use MAD to ﬁlter
out outliers in dxy then get the mean of the rest in dxy as cxy, as shown in Algorithm
3.1, where 1.4826 is a constant linked to the assumption of normality of the data,
disregarding the abnormality induced by outliers.
3.5.2 Recommendation of Possible Access Correlation
The lower value in the table C = [cxy] above, the more likely the pair of access
is correlated. It is hard to deﬁne a threshold to decide whether a pair of accesses
should be treated as correlated, but it is easy to give a sorted list for either prioritized
checking atomicity violation or manual conﬁrmation.
3.6 Algorithm to Infer Access Correlation fromMultiple Traces
To infer access correlation from multiple traces, we need to identify the same vari-
ables across multiple traces. There are two types of shared variables: 1) global
variables; 2) variables dynamically allocated in the heap.
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Program 3.1 Quantify the correlation between pairs of shared variables
FindCorre latedVars ( t r a c eF i l e )
{
Find pairsInAtLeastTwoThreads ;
f o r (x , y ) in pairsInAtLeastTwoThreads
{
f o r each thread thd
{
Acce s sL i s t ax = ac c e s s e s o f x ;
Acce s sL i s t ay = ac c e s s e s o f y ;
Acce s sL i s t a = sor t ed ( ax + ay ) ;
i = 0 ;
whi l e ( i + 1 < a . l ength )
{
i f ( v a r i ab l e o f a [ i ] !=
va r i ab l e o f a [ i +1 ] ) :
D i s t anceL i s t dxy ;
dxy . append ( a [ i +1]−a [ i ] ) ;
i += 1
}
}
mad = median ( abs (dxy−median ( dxy ) ) )
∗ 1 . 4 826 ;
f o r d in dxy
{
Abso luteDev ia t i onL i s t ad ;
ad [ d ] = abs (d−median ( dxy ) ) / mad ;
i f ad [ d ] < 2 :
d i s t anceL i s tNoOut l i e r . append (d ) ;
}
AverageDistance c [ x , y ] =
average ( d i s t anceL i s tNoOut l i e r ) ;
}
re turn so r t ed ( c )
}
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3.6.1 Global Variables
With the symbol table contained in the executable, we are able to ﬁnd the mapping
from address to variable name.
3.6.2 Variables Dynamically Allocated in the Heap
With debug information built into the executable, we can ﬁnd the ﬁle name and
line numbers in the source code for each read or write access. Because our goal is to
ﬁnd the correlation between shared variables, we can assume the shared variables
accessed from the same line of code are highly correlated, thus we can assume there
is only one shared variable for any line of source code.
With the assumption above, we can treat a unique pair of ﬁle name and line
number accessing shared memory as a shared variable so that we can infer access
correlation across multiple traces.
3.7 Serializability of Two-Variable Two-Thread Interleavings
The deﬁnition of serializability of single-variable atomicity violations in the sections
above is not applicable to the atomicity violation with multiple variables involved.
Two-variable atomicity can be achieved by ensuring the atomicity of each pair of
shared variables. So in the sequel, we focus on two-variable atomicity violation.
Given two shared variables x and y, and A ∈ {Read,Write}, R = Read, W =
Write, Let Rx denote reading variable x, Wx denote writing variable x, Ry denote
reading variable y and Wy denote writing variable y. When treating each pair of
correlated shared variables as a single one, Deﬁnition 2 and the patterns in McPatom
[7] can be applied and resulting is called as McPatom-MV1. MUVI [3] requires the
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writes of both variables in forming atomicity violation. Both of the above methods
can ﬁnd possible atomicity violation, however, are overall restrictive and can result
in false positive predictions.
Deﬁnition 4 (Conﬂict graph with two variables). Given two variables x and y,
there is at least one access of x and y in one thread denoted as A1x and A
1
y, and at
least one access of x and y in another thread denoted as A2x and A
2
y, the conﬂict
graph contains a node for each memory access, and an arc if A1v conﬂicts with A
2
v
i.e. at least one of them is a write.
The deﬁnition of conﬂict graph above is generalization of the conﬂict graph for
single variable [28] [5].
Deﬁnition 5 (Serializability with two variables). A two-variable two-thread inter-
leaving is equivalent to a serial execution if the two variables are correlated and the
conﬂict graph is acyclic between two threads.
3.8 Predict Two-Variable Atomicity Violation
This section discusses the simple method using the existing McPatom with patterns
of single variable atomicity violation, and another method extending McPatom with
patterns of two variables atomicity violation. Two methods are independent of each
other.
The framework contains the following major steps: (1) using Pin [26] to in-
strument an interleaved execution of a multi-threaded program and to record an
interleaved trace containing only atomicity violation impacting events including all
shared variable accesses and all synchronization routines (locks, condition variables,
barriers and thread management events); (2) projecting the interleaved trace into a
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partial order thread model of abstract threads, which maintains the causal relation
within actual threads imposed by the synchronization routines, and treats two cor-
related shared variable as a single one using the patterns of single variable or keeps
two correlated shared variables using the patterns of two variables; (3) automati-
cally translating the partial order thread model into a Promela program for model
checking in Spin [10]; (4) deﬁning a complete set of atomicity violation patterns
as in Figure 3.6 [7] involving a pair of threads accessing every single shared vari-
able and automatically translating them into temporal logic formulas; (5) deﬁning
a complete set of atomicity violation patterns involving a pair of threads accessing
every pair of two shared variables and automatically translating them into temporal
logic formulas; (6) using Spin to model check the atomicity violation patterns; and
(7) mapping the violation reported in Spin to the execution trace in the original
multi-threaded program.
Figure 3.7 gives an overview of McPatom framework. If using the patterns of
two-thread atomicity violations with a single variable, the thread model in Promela
treats the two correlated shared variables as a single one. If using the patterns of
two-thread atomicity violations with two variables, the thread model in Promela
keeps the two correlated shared variable.
3.8.1 McPatom-MV1: Use Existing McPatom with Patterns
of Single Variable Atomicity Violation
Using the pairs of correlated memory accesses inferred above, we can integrate
McPatom to ﬁnd atomicity violations for each individual trace, by treating each
pair of correlation memory accesses as a single variable, since McPatom works on
predicting single variable atomicity violation from a single trace.
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Figure 3.7: Overview of the method predicting atomicity violations
When analyzing a single trace, multiple executions of the same line of source
code can access diﬀerent memory addresses that are dynamically allocated in the
heap, and diﬀerent memory addresses are counted as diﬀerent variables. Let L1, L2
be two lines of code denoted by ﬁle name and line number, we can infer access
correlation between L1 and L2 as discussed above. Let's denote a line in the trace
as t, there are two lines of traces t1 and t2 and two memory addresses A1 and A2,
such that t1 = L1A1 and t2 = L2A2 which means t1 accesses the memory address
A1 from the line of source code L1 and the similar for t2.
If A1 and A2 are correlated as the algorithm in Section 3.5, treat t1 and t2 as
the same shared variable.
If L1 and L2 are correlated as the algorithm in Section 3.6, treat t1 and t2 as the
same shared variable.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of methods about coverage of atomicity violation
3.8.2 McPatom-MV2: Extend McPatom with Patterns of
Two Variables Atomicity Violation
McPatom-MV1 above is straightforward to leverage the existing McPatom. How-
ever, it can report more atomicity violations than other methods as shown in Figure
3.8 that potentially means more false positives. To reduce false positives, we pro-
pose the following access patterns speciﬁcally for two-variable atomicity violation.
The result is called McPatom-MV2, having better coverage than MUVI [3] because
MUVI only consider the inconsistent updates that start with write and it cannot
take all shared variables into consideration due to the limitation of static analysis.
3.8.2.1 Patterns of Two-thread Atomicity Violations involving Two Vari-
ables
In the sequel, a two-variable atomicity violation refers to a two-thread atomicity
violation involving any number of accesses of two shared variable x and y, and
A ∈ {Read,Write}, R = Read, W = Write, Rx denotes reading variable x, Wx
denotes writing variable x, Ry denotes reading variable y and Wy denotes writing
variable y. This section gives a set of patterns covering all possible two-variable
atomicity violations.
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Figure 3.9: Unserializable Interleavings with two variables and two threads.
Based on Deﬁnition 4 and Deﬁnition 5, we propose the pattern as in Figure 3.9 as
a complete set of patterns for unserializable interleaving that can be used to predict
atomicity violations with two variables and two threads involved. In pattern 1, Rx
and Wy are interleaved by WxAy or AyWx from thread 2 where Wx from thread 2
unexpectedly changes x that makes it unserializable if Wy is dependent on Rx in
thread 1; in pattern 2, Rx and Ry are interleaved by WxWy or WyWx in thread 2
where Wx and Wy unexpectedly change x and y that makes Rx and Ry in thread
1 reading inconsistent value; in pattern 3, Wx and Wy are interleaved by AxAy or
AyAx in thread 2 where thread 2 could read inconsistent value of x and y or write
x to make x and y inconsistent; in pattern 4, Wx and Ry are interleaved by WyAx
or AxWy in thread 2 where Wy from thread 2 unexpectedly change y and Ax could
unexpectedly read or change x from Wx of thread 1 thus causing unexpected value
in Ry.
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Theorem 1 (Completeness of the set of Patterns in Figure 3.9). The set of patterns
in Figure 3.9 is complete, i.e. it includes all possible unserializable interleavings
between two threads with two variables involved.
Proof. Let At11 , A
t2
2 , ..., A
tn
n be a sequence of atomic accesses in an interleaved ex-
ecution of two threads with two variables involved, in which Atii (ti ∈ {1, 2},
Atii ∈ {Read,Write}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n) denotes an atomic access from thread ti to
the two shared variables. Let every subsequence of At11 , A
t2
2 , ..., A
tn
n be of the form
1) X11 , X
2
2 , Y
2
3 , Y
1
4 where X
1
1 and Y
1
4 of Thread 1 are accesses A
ti
i (ti = 1), X
2
2 and
Y 23 of Thread 2 are accesses A
ti
i (ti = 2), or of the similar form 2) X
1
1 , Y
2
2 , X
2
3 , Y
1
4 , 3)
X11 , X
2
2 , Y
1
3 , Y
2
4 , or 4) X
1
1 , Y
2
2 , Y
1
3 , X
2
4 . The forms are shown in Figure 3.10. Form 2
can be proved similarly, Form 3 is impossible to have conﬂict graph as there is no
cycle between two threads and Form 4 can be reduced to Form 2. The following
proof is based on Form 1. Let Pi be pattern i. If X11 , X
2
2 , Y
2
3 , Y
1
4 does not match with
any of the patterns in Figure 3.9, X11 , X
2
2 , Y
2
3 , Y
1
4 satisﬁes ¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4.
Since operator ∧ is commutative, we can select a speciﬁc order and carry out an
incremental analysis of possible X11 , X
2
2 , Y
2
3 , Y
1
4 based on each of Pi(1 ≤ i ≤ 4).
The details of each step are omitted and as a result, when X11 , X
2
2 , Y
2
3 , Y
1
4 satisﬁes
¬P1 ∧ ¬P2 ∧ ¬P3 ∧ ¬P4, X11 , X22 , Y 23 , Y 14 can only be one of the following:
1) X11 = Wx, X
2
2 = Rx, Y
2
3 = Ry, Y
1
4 = Ry
2)X11 = Wx, X
2
2 = Wx, Y
2
3 = Ry, Y
1
4 = Ry
3) X11 = Rx, X
2
2 = Rx, Y
2
3 = Ry, Y
1
4 = Ry
4) X11 = Rx, X
2
2 = Wx, Y
2
3 = Ry, Y
1
4 = Ry
5) X11 = Rx, X
2
2 = Rx, Y
2
3 = Wy, Y
1
4 = Ry
6) X11 = Rx, X
2
2 = Rx, Y
2
3 = Wy, Y
1
4 = Wy
7) X11 = Rx, X
2
2 = Rx, Y
2
3 = Ry, Y
1
4 = Wy
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Figure 3.10: All Interleaving Forms of Two Variables and Two Threads
According to the Serializability Deﬁnition 5, an interleaved sequence is serial-
izable if and only if its conﬂict graph is acyclic. All of the above seven patterns
are serializable. Therefore, the completeness of the set of patterns in Figure 3.9 is
proved.
3.8.2.2 Automatically Encoding Traces to Promela Code
McPatom-MV2 automatically encodes a trace to multiple Promela ﬁles with each
one containing a pair of shared variables. It deﬁnes each shared variable v in the pair
of shared variables (x, y) as a short in Promela, automatically assigns a unique value
for all reading accesses and a unique value for all writing accesses in each thread.
Formally, let rw ∈ {r, w}, and tid be thread ID, then v=rw+tid for each access of
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v. McPatom sets r to be 0, and w to be 10000. For example, given two threads:
t1(tid=1) and t2(tid=2), and a shared variable v, McPatom makes assignments as
below for each scenario of accesses.
• Assign 10000+1 to v for each writing access of v in thread t1,
• Assign 1 to v for each reading access of v in thread t1,
• Assign 10000+2 to v for each writing access of v in thread t2,
• Assign 2 to v for each reading access of v in thread t2.
McPatom-MV2 automatically generates Promela code for all synchronization primi-
tives, like McPatom [7]. Figure 3.11 gives a sample of partial Promela code encoding
a trace.
3.8.2.3 Automatically Encoding Atomicity Violation Patterns into Lin-
ear Time Temporal Logic (LTL) Formulas
A pattern is a sequence of accesses, for example, R1yW
2
y . Every two adjacent accesses
in the sequence can be captured in a LTL formula, for example R1yW
2
y can be cap-
tured in y == r+1 && X(y == r+1 U y == w+2) where X denotes Next and U
denotes Until. For every pair of shared variable x and y, and every pair of threads
t1 and t2, McPatom-MV2 automatically deﬁnes a pair of LTL formulas including
Formula 3.1 for each pattern in Figure 3.9 and another LTL formula reversing the
view of t1 and t2, another pair of LTL formulas reversing the view of x and y. Let
x and y be a pair of shared variables, r = 0 and w = 10000 as deﬁned in 3.8.2.2,
Ai ∈ {r, w}, and tidi ∈ {1, 2} where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} as there are four accesses in the
pattern.
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proctype t1() { ... }
proctype t2()
{
Lock(lock1);
v_tab = 0 + 2; /* mysql -binlog.c - 53 - (In trace:
15612) */
v_tab = 10000 + 2; /* mysql -binlog.c - 53 - (In
trace: 15613) */
Unlock(lock1); /* mysql -binlog.c - 54 - (In trace:
15617) */
Lock(lock2);
v_numLines_binlog = 0 + 2; /* mysql -binlog.c - 32 -
(In trace: 95478) */
v_numLines_binlog = 10000 + 2; /* mysql -binlog.c -
32 - (In trace: 95479) */
Unlock(lock2); /* mysql -binlog.c - 60 - (In trace:
95482) */
ThdJoin !2;
}
init
{
run t1(); /* mysql -binlog.c - 103 - (In trace: 4) */
run t2(); /* mysql -binlog.c - 104 - (In trace: 5) */
run t3(); /* mysql -binlog.c - 106 - (In trace: 6) */
...
}
Figure 3.11: A Sample of Partial Promela Code
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[]! <> ((x == A1 + tid1)&& X
((x == A1 + tid1)U
((x == r + tid2)U
(x == A2 + tid2 && X
(x == A2 + tid2 U (3.1)
((y == r + tid3 && x == A2 + tid2) U
((y == A3 + tid3 && x == A2 + tid2) && X
((y == A3 + tid3 && x == A2 + tid2)U
((y == r + tid4 && x == A2 + tid2)U
(y == A4 + tid4 && x == A2 + tid2))))))))))}
where [] denotes Always, ! denotes Logical Negation, <> denotes Even-
tually. These formulas specify that the atomicity violation patterns do not occur.
Note that the patterns need to be extended to cover all forms in Figure 3.10, and
the LTL formula allows extra read accesses of the same variable in the same thread
to precede each of the four accesses in the pattern, that is r in the Formula 3.1,
because it happens in the real world and it preserves the conﬂict graph in Deﬁnition
4. Formula 3.1 captures a pattern with A1A2A3A4 where A1 and A2 are accesses
of x and A3 and A4 are accesses of y, and each of A2A3A4 can be preceded with
insigniﬁcant read accesses of the same variable from the same thread.
Using Figure 3.9 (2) as a concrete example, the pattern []! <> R1xW
2
xW
2
yR
1
y can
be captured in the formula in LTL below.
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[]! <> ((x == r + 1)&& X
((x == r + 1)U
((x == r + 2)U
(x == w + 2 && X
(x == w + 2 U (3.2)
((y == r + 2 && x == w + 2) U
((y == w + 2 && x == w + 2) && X
((y == w + 2 && x == w + 2)U
((y == r + 1 && x == w + 2)U
(y == r + 1 && x == w + 2))))))))))}
In Formula 3.2, Line 1 and 2 denote A1 of x from thread 1, that is R1x; Line 3
denotes insigniﬁcant accesses r of x from thread 2 that exist or doesn't exist in the
trace; Line 4 and Line 5 denote A2 of x from thread 2, that is W 2x ; Line 6 denotes
insigniﬁcant accesses r of y while making sure x is still w + 2; Line 7 and Line 8
denote A3 of y from thread 2, that isW 2y ; Line 9 denotes insigniﬁcant accesses r of y;
Line 10 denotes A4 of y from thread 2, that is R1y. Therefore, Formula 3.2 captures
[]! <> R1xW
2
xW
2
yR
1
y and ensures that pattern R
1
xW
2
xW
2
yR
1
y in Figure 3.9 (2) does not
occur in the partial order thread model. LTL formula to capture []! <> R1xW
2
yW
2
xR
1
y
is similar.
3.9 Evaluation
All of our experiments are conducted on a machine with 2 Core 2.3GHz CPU, 4GB
of memory, running Debian 8.7 as the operating system. We use Pin tool 2.14 for
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binary instrumentation and SPIN tool 6.4.6 for model checking. The tool and the
results can be downloaded from https://users.cs.ﬁu.edu/~zsun003/qrs18/
3.9.1 Variable Correlation Analysis
Our variable correlation analysis based on dynamic trace is eﬃcient. For MUVI [3]
it takes about 3 hours to infer variable correlation for 3-4 million lines of code. We
applied our method to the latest Apache Httpd 2.4.29 and it takes about 3 seconds
to infer variable correlation for 1 million lines of code. We inferred 971 pairs of
variable correlation, comparable to the one reported in MUVI. We not only give
the list of variable correlation for reference by programmers or other tools but also
give the qualiﬁed weight for each pair in terms of average distance between the pair
of variables. MUVI took a sample of 100 correlations and manually whether they
are true to give a false positive rate. We believe it is an error-prone process and it
would be better for application developers to justify it so that we provide quantiﬁed
weight and a ranked list.
3.9.2 Two-Variable Atomicity Violation Detection
Table 3.1 shows four real-world two-variable atomicity violation bugs. Our method
can detect all of them. For MySQL-169, the correlation between t  rows and
binlog is conditional, [3] is unable to detect it because t  rows can be accessed
many times and binlog is only modiﬁed after the ﬁnal update of t  rows, and
the static method doesn't get the correlation. ColorSafe [29] is unable to detect it
because the t and binlog are not allocated together. UNICORN [30] is likely unable
to detect it because the length between accesses of t and binlog is beyond the limit
of its sliding window size.
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Table 3.1: Atomicity violation bugs with multiple variables involved
BugId App Description
Moz-js1 Mozilla-
Suite
v0.9
Writes of correlated variables are interleaved
by remote thread's writes, causing the empty
ﬂag to be false for an empty table and system
crash. Shown in Figure 3.1
Moz-js2 Mozilla-
Suite
v0.8
Writes of correlated variables are interleaved
by remote thread's reads which read
intermediate inconsistent values. Shown in
Figure 3.2
MySQL-
2011
MySQL
v4.0.16
http://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=2011
Read to log ﬁle's name and log ﬁle are
interleaved by remote thread rotating logs
thus writing log ﬁle's name and log ﬁle.
MySQL-169 MySQL
v3.23.56
http://bugs.mysql.com/bug.php?id=169
Table deletion and log writing are interleaved
by remote thread's table insertion and log
writing. Shown in Figure 3.3
Regarding performance, it takes about average 2 minutes for Spin model checkers
to check all properties for a pair of variables.
Using MySQL-169 as an example, here is how to run the tool that generates
a trail ﬁle for each possible atomicity violation, and how the trail can tell what is
the interleaved execution with related source code information that is an atomicity
violation. Running the tool is easy, for example,
~/McPatomMV$ sh runMcPatomMV. sh t e s tda ta /mysql−b in log12 /
t r a c e . out Benchmark/mysql−b in l og
where the ﬁrst parameter speciﬁes the path to store the trace output which can
be any empty folder, and the second parameter speciﬁes the executable to run and
trace. After the tool is ﬁnish, it prints the results. But to check results anytime,
the script as shown in Figure 3.13 can be used to print the trail again. Each trail is
an atomicity violation. Note that 10000+1 means Write from thread 1, 0+2 means
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Figure 3.12: Atomicity Violation in MySQL-169
== Atomicity v i o l a t i o n in the bug MySQL−169
Thread 1 Thread 2
Write ( v_tab )
Write ( v_tab )
Write ( v_numLines_binlog )
Write ( v_numLines_binlog )
Read from thread 2, so the p23.trail in Figure 3.13 below is a pattern that violates
atomicity (Pattern 3 in the paper).
3.10 Related Works
There are many recent works on tackling atomicity violations. Some works proposed
techniques to detect atomicity violations on actual program executions through
testing [31], runtime monitoring ([2], [28], and [32]) or predict atomicity violations
based on actual program executions [7][33][8][34][35][6][36][37][38][39][40][41].
We discuss the works related to two-variable atomicity violation in this section.
3.10.1 MUVI
MUVI [3] automatically infers commonly existing two-variable access correlations
through code analysis. It combines static program analysis and data mining tech-
niques to automatically infer two-variable correlations. Firstly, it parses the source
code and collects each function's variable access information, including the set of
variables accessed within each function, the access types and locations in source
code. Secondly, it uses a frequent pattern mining technique to ﬁnd out all the vari-
able sets that frequently appear together and produces a pool of variable access
correlation candidates.
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Figure 3.13: Examples of Experiment Result
== The t oo l to show the atomic i ty v i o l a t i o n and r e l a t e d
source code .
~/McPatomMV/ te s tda ta /mysql−bin log12$ . . / . . / p r i n t t r a i l . sh
spin_numLines_binlog−tab . pml . p23 . t r a i l
v_tab = 0 + 3 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 85 − ( In t r a c e :
13) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 3 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 89 − ( In
t r a c e : 230) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 40 − ( In
t r a c e : 334) ∗/
v_tab = 0 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 53 − ( In t r a c e :
8) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 53 − ( In
t r a c e : 9) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 0 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 32
− ( In t r a c e : 28) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 10000 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e
32 − ( In t r a c e : 41) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 0 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 32
− ( In t r a c e : 349) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 10000 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e
32 − ( In t r a c e : 350) ∗/
spin_numLines_binlog−tab . pml . p24 . t r a i l
v_tab = 0 + 3 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 85 − ( In t r a c e :
13) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 3 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 89 − ( In
t r a c e : 230) ∗/
v_tab = 0 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 53 − ( In t r a c e :
8) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 53 − ( In
t r a c e : 9) ∗/
v_tab = 10000 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 40 − ( In
t r a c e : 334) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 0 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 32
− ( In t r a c e : 349) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 10000 + 1 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e
32 − ( In t r a c e : 350) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 0 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e 32
− ( In t r a c e : 28) ∗/
v_numLines_binlog = 10000 + 2 ; /∗ mysql−b in l og . c − l i n e
32 − ( In t r a c e : 41) ∗/
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MUVI considers two types of variables: global variables and structure ﬁelds. It
cannot take all shared variables into consideration, that is an inherent limitation for
the static method because it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd shared variables precisely in a static
way and it is impossible to deal with all variables so that it has to choose a limited
set of variables for consideration. Instead, the dynamic method used in our works
can ﬁnd correlations even if they are dynamically allocated and not belong to the
same structure. In another aspect, for the correlated structure ﬁelds that are not
shared, ﬁnding them is useless to ﬁnd atomicity violations.
3.10.2 Generation of Unit Tests for Correlated Variables
In [42] test cases are automatically generated to prevent the race condition in cor-
related variables in concurrent programs. Its approach to identifying correlations
between variables is based on static analysis of given program, similar to MUVI
[3]. Besides identifying the variables that are accessed often near to each other, it
also considers variables that are data and/or control dependent on each other. The
variable written in an assignment is considered to be data-dependent on each vari-
able that is read in the assignment. The variable written in a control ﬂow branch
is considered to be control-dependent on variables that are read in the branching
condition. The approach as an extension of MUVI [3] shares the same limitation
that it cannot take all shared variables into consideration due to it static analysis.
Our method based on dynamic analysis can catch those dependencies thus be able
to ﬁnd the same correlation.
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3.10.3 ColorSafe
ColorSafe [29] groups related data into colors, and then monitors access interleavings
in the color space. It has two modes of operation: debugging mode and deployment
mode. In debugging mode, it detects only interleavings that are actually unserial-
izable, i.e., it cannot predict bugs that do not manifest. In deployment mode, it
attempts to dynamically avoid atomicity violations by detecting when an atomicity
violation is likely to happen and dynamically starting a special form of transac-
tion to prevent an unserializable interleaving from happening. However, since it
does not take synchronizations into consideration, it produces false positives and in
correspondence triggers unnecessary bug avoidance actions.
It is related to our work in detecting two-variable atomicity violation based
on related data. It explores both manual coloring and automatic coloring. For
automatic coloring, it is based on memory allocation, that is, it gives the same color
to data allocated together. However, there are a lot of examples on two-variable
atomicity violation in which the correlated variables are not allocated together. [3]
gives two examples in which although the ﬁelds in each pair belong to the same
structure, i.e. they are allocated together, but they do not have access correlation
as they are accessed together in only 34 functions and are accessed separately
in 68 or 87 functions. Instead, our work infers correlation from execution traces
using heuristics, in order to detect bugs regardless how the correlated variables are
allocated.
3.10.4 UNICORN
UNICORN [30] detects order violations, single-variable, and two-variable atomicity
violations. It monitors pairs of memory accesses for each shared variable, combines
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the pairs into problematic patterns, and ranks the patterns by their suspiciousness
scores. There are three steps. It ﬁrstly executes a program multiple times, monitors
memory-access pairs within a ﬁxed-sized sliding window, and marks each program
execution as either passing or failing. Secondly, it combines memory-access pairs
into problematic memory-access patterns using a second ﬁxed-sized sliding window
for maintaining pairs. Thirdly, it computes the suspiciousness of the patterns and
orders them in decreasing order of suspiciousness to recommend possible bugs.
The pairs include only the directly adjacent accesses for each shared variable.
And, for single variable atomicity violation, it follows the three-accesses pattern;
for multiple variable atomicity violation, it follows the four-accesses pattern. Thus
UNICORN has a limitation not be able to check atomicity violation involving more
accesses.
It uses a small ﬁxed-sized window to identify the most suspicious memory-access
patterns, to reduce time and space overhead. Hence for those accesses with a dis-
tance more than the length of the window, it is impossible to detect.
It instruments the source program statically using LLVM, and monitors shared
variable accesses during runtime. It does not instrument the synchronization instruc-
tions and it is based on observed executions, therefore, it cannot predict concurrency
bugs and can only detect concurrency bugs when they manifest. In the experiment,
to increase the probability of program failures, it inserted random artiﬁcial delays
into the programs.
3.11 Summary
Concurrency bugs are extremely hard to detect using testing techniques due to huge
interleaving space. As the most common non-deadlock concurrency bugs, atomicity
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violations are studied in many recent works, however, those methods are applicable
only to single-variable atomicity violation. This chapter presents enhanced tools
McPatom-MV1 and McPatom-MV2 based on McPatom using model checking to
predict atomicity violation concurrency bugs involving two variables. We developed
a unique method inferring the correlation between variables, that is based on dy-
namic analysis and is able to detect the correlation that would be missed by static
analysis.
The tools McPatom-MV1 and McPatom-MV2 is powerful and can explore a vast
interleaving space of a multi-threaded program based on a small set of instrumented
test runs. It is applicable to large real-world systems and can predict atomicity
violations missed by other related works. A limitation inherent from McPatom is
that redundant model checking may be performed if two recorded interleaved traces
yield the same partial order thread model.
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CHAPTER 4
ATOMICITY VIOLATION IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
Reliability of distributed systems is extremely important, especially with the preva-
lence of big data and cloud computing, that bring a lot of stakeholders such as
application's developers and customers into the world of distributed systems and
their inherent complexity. Unfortunately, distributed concurrency bugs exist every-
where, are very challenging to detect during testing, and similar to the concurrency
bugs for multi-threaded programs. Various models have been proposed [43] to ana-
lyze or predict the reliability of large-scale distributed systems, but reliability issues
with these systems still exist. Distributed system's reliability depends on the relia-
bility of each individual component, what's more, it also depends on the reliability
of the communication between components that typically runs over network and
by nature is not reliable, therefore, untimely message delivery or lost messages are
common and need to be tolerated to ensure the reliability of the whole distributed
systems. Transparent fault detection and fault recovery scheme are typically im-
plemented to provide seamless interaction to end users, that includes methods of
automatic redelivery of messages and thus causes duplicated delivery of messages.
All those factors above contribute to the complexity of ensuring the reliability of
distributed systems.
More than 60% of distributed concurrency bugs are triggered by a single un-
timely message delivery that commits order violation or atomicity violation [4, 44].
We study the multiple variable atomicity violations for multi-threaded programs in
Chapter 3. This chapter aims to extend what we learn from Chapter 3 and de-
velop methods to analyze and predict atomicity violation in distributed systems, by
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studying the shared data and distributed lock being used to protect shared data in
distributed systems.
Studies in the recent years have been focused on the infrastructure of distributed
systems that manage the hardware and coordination between them. However, even
the infrastructure is reliable, the application that is running on top of the infrastruc-
ture is not guaranteed to be reliable, actually with the prevalence of applications
moving to microservices architecture that is essentially distributed systems to pro-
vide demanded scalability and availability, it is becoming common to ﬁnd the need
to improve the reliability of applications running on distributed infrastructure. Un-
fortunately distributed concurrency bugs for applications don't receive the same at-
tention as for the underlying infrastructure, developers lack awareness of distributed
concurrency bugs and don't have tools to assist debugging. As a result, distributed
concurrency bugs are common and developers tend to live with the bugs until they
cause serious problems because they are rare and extremely hard to ﬁnd.
4.2 Motivation
Developers assume atomicity or transactions in distributed systems, in a similar
way as multi-threading programs. In distributed systems, there is a layer processing
data, also known as data layer or transaction layer, and there is another layer as
application layer that orchestrates transactions onto the transaction layer.
The transaction layer could be implemented using traditional relations database
that provides ACID guarantee (ACID is atomicity, consistency, isolation, and dura-
bility, more discussions are shown in Section 4.3.1), in that case, atomicity violation
can still happen across diﬀerent transactions, similar to the way atomicity violation
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can manifest in a data race free multi-threading program that uses locks but not
enough locks.
The transaction layer could also be implemented using key-value store that
doesn't provide ACID guarantee, in that case, atomicity violation is more likely
to happen, and it is the application layer to do transactions in a way that can
prevent atomicity violation. That is what to be discussed in this section.
As shown in Program 4.1, there are two functions that are two possible transac-
tions without distributed locks running on two separated machines. Let the account
balance starts with 50,000, the ﬁrst transaction withdraws 25,000 that changes the
balance to be 25,000, and the second transaction deposits 5,000 that changes the
balance to be 30,000. However, if two customer representatives access the same
bank account simultaneously, data integrity could be violated because of atomicity
violation, in the following order.
1. Customer representative 1 fetches bank Account with balance as 50,000
2. Customer representative 2 fetches bank Account with balance as 50,000
3. Customer representative 1 withdraws 25,000 and updates bank Account bal-
ance to be 25,000
4. Customer representative 2 deposits 5,000 and updates Bank Account balance
= 55,000
The above case is a critical disaster to the bank, can be ﬁxed by using a distributed
lock to protect read and write (that is Get and Update in the example).
In a practical case, a customer not only has a balance but also have other cus-
tomer information such as addresses, contact information, and transactions which
can be stored into many diﬀerent tables. As a practice to enable system scaling
horizontally, the bank doesn't use foreign keys in any of those tables so that each
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Program 4.1 Atomicity Violation Without Distributed Locks
withdraw (accountId , withdrawAmount) { // Bank withdrawal
transaction
// Fetch BankAccount object from key -value data
store
BankAccount account = datastore.Get(accountId) as
BankAccount;
// assume balance = 50,000 and withdrawAmount =
25 ,000
if (account != null && account.IsActive)
{
// Withdraw money and reduce the balance
account.Balance -= withdrawAmount;
// Update key -value store with new balance =
25 ,000
datastore.Update(accountId , account);
}
}
deposit (accountId , depositAmount) { // Bank deposit
transaction
// Fetch BankAccount object from key -value data
store
BankAccount account = datastore.Get(accountId) as
BankAccount;
// assume balance = 25,000 and depositAmount =
5,000
if (account != null && account.IsActive)
{
// Deposit money and increment the balance
account.Balance += depositAmount;
// Update cache with new balance = 30,000
datastore.Update ("Key", account);
}
}
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table is isolated from each other. To ensure consistency it makes a lot of sense to
lock a customer during an update, at customer level or ﬁner-grained level such as
customer address level, to avoid atomicity violation.
4.3 Background - Data Consistency and Data Access in Dis-
tributed Systems
Microservices is a software architecture pattern to application development in dis-
tributed systems being adopted by large companies for cloud infrastructure and ap-
plications in the cloud, such as Amazon AWS and Microsoft Azure. That has grown
in popularity in recent years. It is a type of software architecture where large appli-
cations are made up of small, self-contained components working together through
APIs as the interface between components. Each service has a limited scope, con-
centrates on a particular task and is highly independent. This setup allows easy and
large scaling individual components whenever necessary, making the overall systems
essentially distributed systems, where components located on networked computers
communicate and coordinate their actions by passing messages.
How the microservices communicate with each other depends on application's
requirements, but many developers use RESTful API over HTTP with JSON format
for the data, and naturally to facilitate object-oriented programming the data is
typically stored in document-oriented database, or document store, that is designed
for storing, retrieving and managing JSON formatted documents and are one of the
main categories of NoSQL databases.
Document-oriented databases are inherently a subclass of the key-value store,
another NoSQL database concept. Document databases contrast strongly with the
traditional relational database (RDB). Relational databases generally store data
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in separate tables that are deﬁned by the programmer, and a single object may
be spread across several tables. Document databases store all information for a
given object in a single instance in the database, and every stored object can be
diﬀerent from every other. This makes mapping objects into the database a sim-
ple task, normally eliminating anything similar to an object-relational mapping.
This makes document stores attractive for programming web applications, which
are subject to continual change in place, and where the speed of deployment is
an important issue. One of the advantages frequently cited for document-oriented
databases is their performance. Operating with simpler data structures than those
of SQL databases, document-oriented databases have often shown faster speeds of
storage and retrieval. However, while they may oﬀer advantages in handling larger
volumes of unstructured data more rapidly, they typically lack the ACID (atomic-
ity, consistency, isolation, and durability) properties because of trading oﬀ ACID
compliance for other properties, such as 100% availability and faster speeds.
In this section, we discuss ACID of traditional relational databases and what that
helps to ensure correctness of distributed systems and discuss CAP theorem which
applies to all distributed systems especially for key-value stores that don't provide
the ACID guarantee. Based on CAP theorem, we list diﬀerent consistent types of
a single item in distributed systems, in which eventual consistency is popular to
provide better availability than strong consistency but strong consistency is some-
times required but ignored by developers and once it is ignored in many diﬀerent
places of the distributed systems and it becomes very hard to ﬁnd them before they
cause serious harms. Our goal essentially is to analyze and predict such violation of
strong consistency that leads to atomicity violation bugs. We also discuss the data
access pattern commonly being used in recent distributed systems, that present us
opportunities to analyze distributed systems without having access to source code
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by examining the data access in the network traﬃc. Finally, we discuss distributed
locks and write-with-version that can be used to achieve strong consistency when
necessary to avoid atomicity violation bugs.
4.3.1 ACID of Traditional Relational Database
The ACID properties of traditional relational database help to ensure the data
integrity. While it is typically not present for key-value stores, it is helpful to
understand what we need to ensure correctness of a distributed system. ACID
consists of 4 features.
• Atomic: The transaction should either succeed to a new state or fail to the
original state. In other words, all or nothing should be committed.
• Consistent: Any transaction will bring the system from one valid state to
another. Note that it is diﬀerent from the consistency in CAP Theorem, as
the consistency of ACID is for the state of the whole system, however, the
CAP is about the consistency of a single item.
• Isolated: Transactions cannot interfere with each other. This feature ensures
only one transaction can occur simultaneously for a single item.
• Durable: Once a transaction has been committed, it will remain so. The
database should persist everything after the transaction is completed.
4.3.2 CAP Theorem
The CAP theorem [45, 46], also named Brewer's theorem after computer scientist
Eric Brewer, states that it is impossible for a distributed data store to simultaneously
provide more than two out of the following three guarantees:
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• Consistency: Every read receives the most recent write or an error
• Availability: Every request receives a non-error response - without the guar-
antee that it contains the most recent write
• Partition tolerance: The system continues to operate despite an arbitrary
number of messages being dropped (or delayed) by the network between nodes
In particular, the CAP theorem implies that in the presence of a network partition
that is part of any distributed system, one has to choose between consistency and
availability. Note that consistency, as deﬁned in the CAP theorem, is quite diﬀerent
from the consistency guaranteed in ACID database transactions. The consistency
in ACID of traditional databases is for the whole system while the consistency in
CAP theorem is for a single item. We discuss the consistency of a single item in the
following section to clarify why atomicity violation bugs exist in distributed systems.
4.3.3 Consistency Types
To discuss further on the consistency of a single item, there are a few diﬀerent
consistency types.
• Strong consistency: Strong consistency is a consistency model where all subse-
quent accesses after the update to a single item will always return the updated
value.
• Weak consistency: It is a consistency model used in distributed computing
where subsequent accesses cannot guarantee returning the updated value.
• Eventual consistency: Eventual consistency is a special type of weak consis-
tency model in which if no new updates are made to a given single data item,
eventually all accesses to that item will return the last updated value.
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For most cases, eventual consistency is acceptable and provides better availability
which is important. However, there are cases strong consistency is desired but
ignored by developers that would lead to serious atomicity violation bugs.
4.3.4 Data Access via HTTP based API calls
In microservice, developers access data via HTTP interfaces and most projects
follow RESTful architectural style when using HTTP interfaces. In the world of
RESTful architectural style, a resource is a state representation of data and each
resource is addressable at a unique path. A resource can have child resources, that is
nested resources, for example, http://{host}/customers/{customerId}/balance has
a resource that is a customer identiﬁed by customerId and a child resource named
balance. For such RESTful design, we can detect all data access by checking URI
(Uniform Resource Identiﬁer) in the web traﬃc. And for those not exactly following
RESTful design, such as the resource path in HTTP header or body rather than in
HTTP URI, a speciﬁc rule can be deﬁned accordingly to extract the resource path
properly from web traﬃc. In this work, we focus on the data accesses that follows
RESTful design.
4.3.5 Distributed Locks - Pessimistic Concurrency Control
One of the common problems found when building large scale distributed systems is
how to ensure that only one process (or one server) across a cluster of servers access
a resource. The resource can be a database, a ﬁle or data entries in a database.
Without ACID guarantee by popular No-SQL databases, it is important to protect
the accesses to data in the database that are shared by multiple processes or servers
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when necessary. Actually, even with the ACID guarantee, there could be a need to
protect the accesses across multiple transactions at the application level.
For many cases, eventual consistency is acceptable and would be the chosen
model to provide better availability. However, there are cases where strong consis-
tency is necessary. To achieve strong consistency of shared data, it needs a simple
way to coordinate the execution of processes and ensure there is only one process ac-
cessing the resource at a time when needed. There are a lot of works on distributed
lock management [47, 48, 49, 50], which is also known as pessimistic concurrency
control [51]. When the atomicity of accesses to shared data is not enforced through
distributed locks, it can be violated just like how atomicity violation manifests in
multi-threaded programs.
As shown in Section 4.3.4, it is acceptable to assume the microservices are
designed and implemented following RESTful way in which each resource has a
unique URI to allow retrieval or updating. Similar to what is presented in Section
4.3.4 where each customer has a unique URI http://{host}/customers/{customerId}
and the balance of a customer can be queried or updated at http://{host}/ cus-
tomers/{customerId}/balance, the distributed lock also has its URI such as http://
{host}/ locks/{lockId}, in which lockId can be its resource URI http://{host}/locks/
customers/{customerId}. A HTTP POST operation is to acquire a lock and a HTTP
Delete operation is to release the lock with the same lock Id.
4.3.6 Write-with-Version - Optimistic Concurrency Control
Distributed locks guarantee the strong consistency with the cost of performance be-
cause it takes extra time to acquire a lock and even more time to wait for a lock
in case it has been acquired by others. It is applicable to all memory access pat-
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terns. Write-with-version is the technique to guarantee strong consistency for certain
memory access pattern that is read-then-write, without using distributed locks and
its performance cost. Write-with-version is also known as optimistic concurrency
control [52, 51].
To implement write-with-version, the data store is designed to provide a version
number for each resource. Each time data is changed in resources, the version
number changes. For instance, whenever a client retrieves data for a resource, it
also receives the version of the resource since the version is part of the resource.
And when a client performs an update, it provides the version of the resource that
it is changing. If the provided version in the update request doesn't match the
actual version of the resource in the data store, the update is rejected, typically
with a HTTP error code 409 that means conﬂict, thus prevent inconsistency. It is
ultimately the responsibility of client developers to deal with such update failure,
which typically is reading again before write.
4.4 Predict Atomicity Violation in Distributed Systems
4.4.1 Overview of Our Method
Based on the method using the existing McPatom with patterns of single variable
atomicity violation, and another method in Chapter 3 extending McPatom with
patterns of two variables atomicity violation, this section discusses a new method
to predict atomicity violation in distributed systems, by applying what was learned
from the above methods and studying the diﬀerence in distributed systems while
there are similarities between protecting shared variables in multi-threaded programs
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and shared data in distributed systems that run on multiple processes or multiple
machines.
The framework contains the following major steps: (1) using Web Proxy Fid-
dler [53] to log web traﬃc of a microservice that provides RESTful API for data
access and to record an interleaved trace containing only atomicity violation im-
pacting events including all shared data accesses and all distributed lock accesses;
(2) projecting the interleaved trace into a partial order process model of abstract
processes, which maintains the causal relation within actual processes imposed by
the distributed locks and write-with-version, and treats two correlated shared data
as a single one using the patterns of single variable or keeps two correlated shared
data using the patterns of two variables; (3) automatically translating the partial
order process model into a Promela program for model checking in Spin [10]; (4)
deﬁning a complete set of atomicity violation patterns as in Figure 3.6 [7] involving
a pair of processes accessing every single shared data and automatically translating
them into temporal logic formulas; (5) deﬁning a complete set of atomicity violation
patterns involving a pair of processes accessing every pair of two shared data and
automatically translating them into temporal logic formulas; (6) using Spin to model
check the atomicity violation patterns; and (7) presenting the violation reported in
Spin to a Petri net model for easy manual inspection.
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the method. If using the patterns of two-thread
atomicity violations with a single variable, the thread model in Promela treats the
two correlated shared variables as a single one. If using the patterns of two-thread
atomicity violations with two variables, the thread model in Promela keeps the two
correlated shared variable.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Method for Distributed Systems
4.4.2 Tracing the Execution of Microservices
Microservices run over HTTP in a sequence of RESTful API calls on a cluster of
machines, we use a popular free web debugging proxy named Fiddler to capture all
HTTP traﬃc from each machine in the cluster of the microservice, that includes all
API calls to retrieve or update shared data, and acquire or release locks.
Each API call has a unique tracking Id to track all events during the API call
from beginning to end. The tracking Id can be any Id that is unique in HTTP
headers. A machine has concurrent API calls, and as a result, a cluster of machines
also has concurrent API calls. Among those API calls, HttpGet is a reading of
shared data, HttpPut is a write of shared data. For shared data, HttpPost and
HttpDelete are out of consideration as they either create or delete resources and are
not related to the typical cases of reading and writing the same resource. However,
HttpPost is the one to acquire a lock due to its nature of creating a resource, and
HttpDelete is the one to release a lock by its nature of deleting a resource.
Figure 4.2 shows a possible trace for the example in Program 4.1,
Figure 4.3 shows another trace of a microservice using distributed locks, in which
HttpPost http://localhost/locks/actionis a trace of acquiring a lock with lock Id
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Figure 4.2: An Example of Trace
trackingId Event ResourceUri Response
trackingId -1 HttpGet http :// localhost/accounts /123456/
balance 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpPut http :// localhost/accounts /123456/
balance 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpGet http :// localhost/accounts /123456/
balance 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpPut http :// localhost/accounts /123456/
balance 200OK
action that is used to protect the resource with resource Id action, and the
corresponding HttpDeleteis a trace of releasing the lock.
Figure 4.4 gives an example of the trace that involves write-with-version, which
guarantee the strong consistency like distributed locks but without using distributed
locks. The group of events by trackingId-1 simply read and write the resource suc-
cessfully, however, in the group of events by trackingId-2 it get a response with
HTTP status code 409Conﬂict and then read and write the same resource success-
fully, which is considered the pattern of write-with-version, essentially like using a
distributed lock that guarantees the strong consistency between reads and writes.
Figure 4.5 presents a visualization of the trace in an interleaving between two track-
ings that are on two processes or two machines.
4.4.3 Deﬁning and Encoding Unserializable Interleaving Pat-
terns between Two Processes
Based on the work of Chapter 3 that deﬁnes the unserializable interleaving patterns
between two threads, this section proposes patterns to solve the problem between
two processes in distributed systems with diﬀerent challenges that are distributed
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Figure 4.3: An Example of Trace With Locks
trackingId Event ResourceUri Response
trackingId -1 HttpPost http :// localhost/locks/action 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpPut http :// localhost/action 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpDelete http :// localhost/locks/action 200
OK
trackingId -1 HttpPost http :// localhost/locks/length 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpPut http :// localhost/length 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpDelete http :// localhost/locks/length 200
OK
trackingId -2 HttpPost http :// localhost/locks/action 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpGet http :// localhost/action 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpDelete http :// localhost/locks/action 200
OK
trackingId -2 HttpPost http :// localhost/locks/length 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpGet http :// localhost/length 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpDelete http :// localhost/locks/length 200
OK
Figure 4.4: An Example of Trace for Write-with-Version
trackingId Event ResourceUri Response
trackingId -1 HttpGet http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpGet http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 200OK
trackingId -1 HttpPut http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpPut http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 409
Conflict
trackingId -2 HttpGet http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 200OK
trackingId -2 HttpPut http :// localhost :5984/ main/
patient_2_e9ecad62 -b2f0 -428a-8ecc -6797 ef420d98 200OK
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Figure 4.5: The Interleaving Pattern of Write-with-Version
locks and write-with-version, since write-with-version can be considered equivalent
to a pair of read and write with proper distributed locks while preserving the seman-
tics about strong consistency. To accommodate the cases of write-with-version, the
pattern needs to take the API calling response code into consideration to identify
the scenario of version conﬂict.
4.4.3.1 Unserializable Interleaving Patterns with Single Resource In-
volved
Figure 4.6 shows all possible scenarios of unserializable interleavings with only one
access from Process 2. If any of the unserializable interleaving patterns is matched,
it indicates a potential atomicity violation.
66
Figure 4.6: Unserializable Interleavings with two processes. In (1)(2)(3)(5), W in
Process 2 unexpectedly changes the value; In (4), An intermediate value in Process
1 is read by Process 2. (3) is the pattern to recognize write-with-version as valid
concurrency control, by making sure there is no writing returning conﬂict before-
hand, marked asW409 since 409 is the HTTP status code for conﬂict. Other accesses
marked R200 and W200 mean read with success and write with success correspond-
ingly.
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4.4.3.2 Unserializable Interleaving Patterns with Multiple Resources In-
volved
For the case with multiple resources involved, it is not aﬀected by write-with-version
which is for the same resource, so it is not necessary to check the response code of
API calling, and Figure 3.9 can be simply reused.
4.4.4 Analyzing the Trace
The unique tracking Id of API calls can be used to group all events captured in
Fiddler web proxy into API call processes in which each process has a unique tracking
Id and contains multiple events about shared data and distributed locks.
4.4.4.1 Description of the Partial Order Process Model
For a multi-process microservice running R, an execution σ = s1, ..., sn of is a
sequence of executed accesses of resources. An execution can be projected to a
sequence of annotated shared data accesses and synchronization events, which is the
trace to analyze in this work. Formally, a trace, τ = e1, ..., em is a sequence of events
where each event ei(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a tuple 〈tidi, timestampi, actioni, responsei〉 in
which tidi is a tracking Id of API calls, timestampi is a time stamp based on real time
and actioni is one of the following: (read/write, a shared resource) or (lock/unlock, a
lock resource), and responsei is the result of the action which is HTTP status code
such as 200OK, 201Created, 409Conﬂict and etc. in the context of microservice
based systems.
Given a trace τ = e1, ..., em containing shared data accesses and lock
events, a partial order process model (Eτ ,≺) is deﬁned as follows:
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1. Eτ = {ei | ei in τ}
(a) ≺ is a partial order relation such that, for any ei, ej ∈ E (i 6= j), ei ≺ ej
iﬀ tidi = tidj and i < j
(b) Mutual exclusion: for any ei, ej, em, en ∈ E (i 6= j 6= m 6= n), ej ≺ em or
en ≺ ei iﬀ
i. tidi = tidj, actioni = (Lock, lvar), actionj = (Unlock, lvar), and
ii. tidm = tidn, actionm = (Lock, lvar), actionn = (Unlock, lvar) in
which lvar is a lock resource.
The partial order above deﬁnes the causal relation and is similar to the happened-
before relation given in Section 3.3.1. The above deﬁnition ensures (1) shared data
accesses within the same process are ordered, and (2) the constraint of lock is pre-
served regarding its impact to the shared data accesses across multiple processes.
Therefore, it captures alternative traces that obey the same causal relation as τ
and thus equivalent to the original trace, and each alternative trace τ ′ is a result
of rearranging the order of some shared data accesses across diﬀerent processes
without breaking the constraint by ≺. The partial order process model enables
exploration of all possible alternative traces that correspond to a set of feasible in-
terleavings in a multi-process microservice running. However, the model provides
an over-approximation without considering data-ﬂow and dependencies between mi-
croservices processes, thus cannot guarantee each alternative trace captured in the
model can be projected back to some feasible interleaved execution in the multi-
process microservice running R, that is the reason for false positives.
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4.4.4.2 Automatically Encoding Traces to Promela Code
The method in [7] to automatically encoding traces to Promela code can be modiﬁed
by adding support of response code to build a partial order process model in Promela
for each shared resource. And to check for atomicity violation involving multiple
resources, the method in Section 3.4 can be applied to infer correlations between
shared resources.
This work automatically encodes a trace to multiple Promela ﬁle with each one
containing a single shared resource, or a pair of shared resources. It deﬁnes each
shared resource v as a short in Promela, automatically assigns a unique value for all
reading accesses and a unique value for all writing accesses in each thread. Formally,
let rw ∈ {r, w}, and tid be tracking Id of the API calling, then v=rw+tid for each
access of v. Our work sets r to be 0, and w to be 10000 in case of failure such
as 409Conﬂict and to be 20000 in case of success such as 200OK, 201Created. For
example, given two tracking: t1(tid=1) and t2(tid=2), and a shared resource v, our
work makes assignments as below for each scenario of accesses.
• Assign 10000+1 to v for each writing access of v in tracking t1 that has failing
response 409Conﬂict,
• Assign 20000+1 to v for each writing access of v in tracking t1 that has
successful response 200OK,
• Assign 1 to v for each reading access of v in tracking t1,
• Assign 10000+2 to v for each writing access of v in tracking t2 that has failing
response 409Conﬂict,
• Assign 20000+2 to v for each writing access of v in tracking t2 that has
successful response 200OK,
• Assign 2 to v for each reading access of v in tracking t2.
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proctype t1 ( ) { . . . }
proctype t2 ( )
{
v_patient_2_e9ecad62−b2f0−428a−8ecc−6797 ef420d98 = 2 ;
v_patient_2_e9ecad62−b2f0−428a−8ecc−6797 ef420d98 = 10002 ;
v_patient_2_e9ecad62−b2f0−428a−8ecc−6797 ef420d98 = 2 ;
v_patient_2_e9ecad62−b2f0−428a−8ecc−6797 ef420d98 = 20002 ;
}
i n i t
{
run t1 ( ) ;
run t2 ( ) ;
. . .
}
Figure 4.7: A Sample of Partial Promela Code
Our work automatically generates Promela code for all synchronization primitives,
like McPatom [7]. Figure 4.7 gives a sample of partial Promela code encoding a
trace for Figure 4.4.
The resulting Promela code can be model checked with the patterns to predict
alternative traces which is missing locks or write-with-version that are necessary to
prevent atomicity violations. The following section discusses encoding the patterns
into LTL formulas for the model checking tool Spin to use.
4.4.4.3 Automatically Encoding Atomicity Violation Patterns into Lin-
ear Time Temporal Logic (LTL) Formulas
For every shared resource and every pair of tracking t1 and t2, our work automat-
ically deﬁnes a LTL formula (4.1) for each pattern in Figure 4.6 and another LTL
formula (4.2) reversing the view of t1 and t2. Let v be a shared resource, r = 0,
w200 = 20000 and w409 = 10000 as deﬁned in section 4.4.4.2, Ai ∈ {r, w200, w409},
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and tidi , tidi ∈ {1, 2}.
[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1)&&
X((v == A2 + tid2)U((v == A3 + tid3)&& (4.1)
X((v == A4 + tid4)U(v == A5 + tid5)))))
[]! <> ((v == A1 + tid1)&&
X((v == A2 + tid2)U((v == A3 + tid3)&& (4.2)
X((v == A4 + tid4)U(v == A5 + tid5)))))
where [] denotes Always, ! denotes Logical Negation, <> denotes Even-
tually, X denotes Next and U denotes Until. These formulas specify that the
atomicity violation patterns do not occur.
Using Figure 4.6 (3) as a concrete example, one formula in LTL is shown below:
[]! <> ((!(v = w409 + 1)X(v == r + 1))&&
X((v == r + 1)U((v == w200 + 2)&& (4.3)
X((v == w200 + 2)U(v == w200 + 1)))))
The predicted trace can be false positives and need to be examined to conﬁrm.
To make it easier to manually inspect the predictions, we propose a method to build
a Petri net model from the predicted trace as in the following section.
4.4.4.4 Automatically Build a Petri Net Model From Predicted Trace
Petri net model is a natural choice to model the message passing, shared data and
distributed locks that are all we need to analyze atomicity violation in distributed
systems. Petri nets deﬁne elementary process steps as transitions that can model
message passing and processing, and deﬁne data repositories as places. Each token
in a place is a resource that could be shared data, and a transition consuming a token
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from a place essentially locks the token and its representing shared data, a transition
producing a token essentially unlocks the token and its representing shared data.
Modeling running of microservice is essentially modeling multiple processes in
which each process has multiple sequential transitions. Each transition can access
shared data including read access and write access, and for each shared data, its
access in each process can be summarized as read, write, read-then-write, write-
then-read. As shown in Figure 4.8, A process can have multiple transitions T1, T2
and more, their sequence is modeled by using a place between transitions. If it is
a single read access T3 can be used and if it is a single write access, T4 can be
used. In the case of read-then-write, a combination of T3 and T4 can be used like
T5. When it is write-then-read, two transitions T6 and T7 are needed to model its
sequence. A transition is atomic thus implying a proper distributed lock is used,
so in case there is no distributed lock to guard multiple accesses, the corresponding
transition can be labeled as NonAtomic to alert developers to check whether it is
a case to add a distributed lock.
Our tool generates a simple text ﬁle describing the places, transitions and the
edges between them, and use Graphviz [54] to visualize it. Petri nets in the following
Figures are manually built to include annotations for easier understanding in this
dissertation.
The automatically built Petri net model can be used to visually inspect a model
to check whether the locking is suﬃcient to avoid atomicity violation.
For the example in Program 4.1, we build a Petri net model as shown in Figure
4.9 with manually annotations. Because of no distribution lock in place to guard
its atomicity, we mark the transition in the Petri net model as NonAtomic. In the
model, ϕ(AccountBalance) = P(accountId× balance) where an account is queried
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Figure 4.8: Petri Net Modeling Method Overview
or updated by its accountId. Two transitions can be two Deposit, two Withdraw,
or what is shown in 4.1 that is one Deposit and one Withdraw.
There are cases that distributed lock is used but not enough or properly, as shown
in the example of Figure 4.3. A Petri net model is built as in Figure 4.10, in which
we don't mark any transition as NonAtomic as there are distributed locks being
used to ensure those transitions being atomic. However, when we inspect the Petri
Figure 4.9: An Example of Petri Net Model
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Figure 4.10: An Example of Petri Net Model With Atomic Transitions
net model, it is clear that there is a possible atomicity violation if the transitions are
ﬁred in the order: T1, T3, T4, T2 which essentially read inconsistent intermediate
states.
4.5 Evaluation
All of our experiments are conducted on a machine with 2 Core 2.3GHz CPU, 4GB
of memory, running Debian 8.7 as the operating system. We use Fiddler v5.0 for web
traﬃc logging and SPIN tool 6.4.6 for model checking. Our experiments discover
two bugs that were not known.
4.5.1 HospitalRun: an open source electronic medical record
system
HospitalRun [55] is a freely available modern software platform for developing world
hospitals, that uses CouchDB [56] as the underlying NoSQL data store through its
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HTTP based RESTful API. It has been forked more than 1000 times in Github
by other developers and has 233 thousands lines of code. The project is based on
Node.js and we are able to conﬁgure Node.js to use the proxy set up by Fiddler
Web Proxy so that it captures all HTTP/HTTPS traﬃc to and from the underlying
CouchDB.
Our tool captured a trace of 292KB and found an atomicity violation that was
not reported and we can reproduce. It took about 2 seconds to infer the correla-
tion between shared resources and less than one minute for Spin model checkers
to check all properties for a shared resource or a pair of shared resources. Fol-
lowing are the relevant trace when trying to reproduce the predicted atomicity
violation. HttpPost was used to query resources with multiple resource keys to
query in the HTTP body. We had to deﬁne a special rule to interpret a HttpPost
on the API endpoint /main/_all_docs?include_docs=true to be a reading event
with the resource to be read in the HTTP body. As shown in Figure 4.11, it read
the resource visit_2_ﬀ493467-7087-407d-b9f9-f0cc03fbc167 then wrote the resource
billingLineItem _2_13f5c098-b31c-4e70-ae4a-b5f92792c725 in tracking 1, which is
meant to query the list of imaging requested for a visit then generate a bill item for
the visit based on all imaging requests. It got one imaging request and then gen-
erated a bill item for the invoice. However, before generating the invoice, another
API came in to update the resource visit_2_ﬀ493467-7087-407d-b9f9-f0cc03fbc167
with an extra imaging request that resulted in two imaging requests for the visit to
charge, so that the invoice missed the new imaging request and became a loss for
the hospital.
It can happen when the administrator open the invoice page and left for a while
so that upon coming back to the invoice page and generate an invoice it triggered
the atomicity violation bug. As shown in Figure 4.12, it has two imaging request
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Figure 4.11: A Sample of Partial Trace
POST http :// localhost :5984/ main/_all_docs?include_docs=
true HTTP /1.1
{"keys ":[" visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 "]}
user -agent: 1
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
{"id":" visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 ","key
":" visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 ","
value ":{" imaging ":["0 df33a57 -2149 -43ef-a72d -2947
b1e3e6d7 "] ,...}}}}
PUT http :// localhost :5984/ main/visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d
-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 HTTP /1.1
{"_rev ":"2 -36 bf667062d2faf0f1a963b0e4747b1f ","_id":"
visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 ","data
":{" imaging ":["0 df33a57 -2149 -43ef-a72d -2947 b1e3e6d7
" ,"5636ab7c -99a1 -4e26 -99df -55 cc05cb4556 "]...}}}
user -agent: 2
HTTP /1.1 201 Created
PUT http :// localhost :5984/ main/billingLineItem_2_13f5c098
-b31c -4e70 -ae4a -b5f92792c725 HTTP /1.1
{"_rev ":"1-6 ebb79c0cf3869dd521d561fca2000da ","_id":"
billingLineItem_2_13f5c098 -b31c -4e70 -ae4a -b5f92792c725
","data ":{" amountOwed ":150 ,...}}}
user -agent: 1
HTTP /1.1 201 Created
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Figure 4.12: Screenshot when reproducing the predicted atomicity violation
including one Xray and one CT, according to the pricing, the total should be $950,
however, the generated invoice is $150 because it is missing one imaging request
caused by the atomicity violation.
Our tool found the two shared resources visit_2_ﬀ493467-7087-407d-b9f9-f0cc03
fbc167 and billingLineItem_2_13f5c098-b31c-4e70-ae4a-b5f92792c725 are correlated
because they often show up together in the trace which is as expected since the bill
item is for the correlated visit. Then for each pair of correlated resources, our tool
generated Promela code that includes one example as shown in Figure 4.13.
The model checking tool Spin gave a trace of predicted atomicity violation,
according to the pattern (1) in Figure 3.9, based on that, our tool generated a Petri
net model as shown in Figure 4.14, in which the type is deﬁned as below with Id
being a string for the unique Id and V alue being a string for the value of the resource
speciﬁed by the Id. Each place is a power set that allows to query the existence of
a Id and update the value for a Id. When the transition is ﬁred in the order of T1,
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Figure 4.13: Partial Promela Code of the HospitalRun trace
proctype t1()
{
...
v_visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 = 1;
v_billingLineItem_2_13f5c098 -b31c -4e70 -ae4a -
b5f92792c725 = 20001;
...
}
proctype t2()
{
...
v_visit_2_ff493467 -7087 -407d-b9f9 -f0cc03fbc167 = 20002;
...
}
init
{
run t1();
run t2();
}
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T2 and T3, it simulates the predicted atomicity violation.
ϕ(V isit) =P(Id× V alue)
ϕ(BillingLineItem) =P(Id× V alue)
R(T1) =∃ (v ∈ V isit)  (
v[1] = V isitIdToQuery
∧ V isit′ = V isit
)
R(T2) =∃ (v ∈ V isit)  (
v[1] = V isitIdToQuery
∧ V isit′ = V isit \ {v} ∪ {(v[1], visitIdNewV alue)}
)
R(T3) =∃ (b ∈ BillingLineItem)  (
b[1] = BillingLineItemIdToQuery
∧BillingLineItem′ = BillingLineItem \ {b} ∪ {(b[1], NewV alue)}
)
4.5.2 Google Cloud Storage FUSE: A user-space ﬁle system
for interacting with Google Cloud Storage
Google Cloud Storage FUSE (GCS-FUSE) is a Google-developed open source FUSE
adapter that allows to mount Google Cloud Storage buckets as ﬁle systems on Linux
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Figure 4.14: Petri net model for the predicted atomicity violation
Figure 4.15: Examples of Google Cloud Storage JSON API
get GET /b/bucket/o/object Retrieves an
object or its metadata.
insert POST /upload/storage/v1/b/bucket/o Stores a
new object and metadata.
insert POST /b/bucket1/o/object1/copyTo/bucket2/o/
object2 Copies an existing object to another object
update PUT /b/bucket/o/object Updates an object 's
metadata.
delete DELETE /b/bucket/o/object Deletes an object
and its metadata.
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or macOS systems. It is based on Google Cloud Storage JSON API which is RESTful
as shown in a few example API calls in Figure 4.15.
Here are a few steps to facilitate capturing web traﬃc of GCS-FUSE.
1. Copy root certiﬁcate generated by web proxy to /etc/ssl/certs/
2. export http_proxy=127.0.0.1:8888
3. export https_proxy=127.0.0.1:8888
4. Run GCS-FUSE in foreground mode:
gcsfuse --foreground gcs-fuse-av ~/projects/gcs-fuse/
Our tool captured a trace of 224KB and found an atomicity violation that was not
reported and we can reproduce. It took less than one minute for Spin model checkers
to check all properties. Following Figure 4.16 shows the relevant traces. GCS-FUSE
uses a generation number to represent the version of a ﬁle inode in the ﬁle system,
and increase the generation whenever making a change to the ﬁle inode. When up-
loading a ﬁle to the existing ﬁle inode, GCS-FUSE uploads the ﬁle to a temporary
stream with a bigger generation number and copies the temporary stream to the des-
tination ﬁle inode as shown in the API /copyTo/b/{blockName}/o/{objectName}
of Figure 4.16.
GCS-FUSE doesn't follow exactly RESTful API design about the resource URI,
but we can deﬁne simple rules to ﬁgure out object names from the URIs according
to the pattern shown in Figure 4.15. For the object as shared resource, our tool
generated Promela code that includes one example as shown in Figure 4.17.
The model checking tool Spin gave a trace of predicted atomicity violation,
according to the pattern (3) in Figure 4.6, based on that, our tool generated a Petri
net model as shown in Figure 4.18, in which the type is deﬁned as below with Id
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Figure 4.16: A Sample of Partial Trace of GCS-FUSE
GET https ://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/gcs -
fuse -av/o/atom.bib?alt=media&generation
=1540133382180427 HTTP /1.1
user -agent: 1
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
POST https ://www.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/gcs -fuse -av/
o/. goutputstream -BMRWQZ/copyTo/b/gcs -fuse -av/o/atom.
bib?ifSourceMetagenerationMatch =1& projection=full&
sourceGeneration =1540135196194955 HTTP /1.1
user -agent: 1
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
GET https ://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/gcs -
fuse -av/o/atom.bib?alt=media&generation
=1540133382180427 HTTP /1.1
user -agent: 2
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
POST https ://www.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/gcs -fuse -av/
o/. goutputstream -3 RY5QZ/copyTo/b/gcs -fuse -av/o/atom.
bib?ifSourceMetagenerationMatch =1& projection=full&
sourceGeneration =1540135201098064 HTTP /1.1
user -agent: 2
HTTP /1.1 200 OK
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Figure 4.17: Partial Promela Code of the GCS-FUSE trace
proctype t1()
{
...
v_atom_bib = 1;
v_atom_bib = 20001;
...
}
proctype t2()
{
...
v_atom_bib = 2;
v_atom_bib = 20002;
...
}
init
{
run t1();
run t2();
}
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Figure 4.18: Petri net model for the predicted atomicity violation
being a string for the unique Id and V alue being a string for the value of the resource
speciﬁed by the Id. The place is a power set that allows to query the existence of a
Id and update the value for a Id. When the transition is ﬁred in the order of T1,
T2, T3, and T4, it simulates the predicted atomicity violation.
ϕ(Object) =P(Id× V alue)
4.6 Related Works
DCatch [57] predicted distributed concurrency bugs including atomicity violation
bugs by analyzing the correct execution of distributed systems. It designed a set
of happens-before rules, runtime tracing tools and trace analysis tools. Its focus
was on the infrastructure software that helps to run a distributed system. Our
work focuses on the applications that are run on top of the infrastructure software,
that are designed in microservice based architecture style and uses RESTful API
for shared data access.
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In [58] a formal framework is presented based on Petri nets for the process ﬂow
in microservices architecture style. It helped to analyze the process ﬂow deﬁned in
an orchestration engine that is in charge of enacting a script to deﬁne the high-level
control and data ﬂows. It can be applied to the speciﬁc orchestration languages
to model the communication between microservices that are deﬁned by the orches-
tration. However, in the real world microservices are much more than those ones
deﬁned in orchestration. Our work is ﬂexible to model the communication between
any microservices.
In [59] it was investigated how to extract a process model from system event
logs. The research area of process mining focused on extracting information about
processes by checking system event logs including which activities are performed,
at what time, by whom and in the context of which case (i.e., process instance).
By explicitly using the case context, process discovery algorithms are capable of
constructing process models that accurately describe the process [59]. Our captured
web traﬃc about API calls in microservices is similar to the interested data in system
event logs, including which API is called, at what time, on what resources and in the
context of which tracking Id. Our extracted Petri nets models accurately describe
the shared data, their accesses, and the related distributed locks.
4.7 Summary
Distributed concurrency bugs often have really simple causes and can be caught by
simple tests [44], however, they are extremely hard to troubleshoot and detect due to
its complex non-deterministic nature. As the most common distributed concurrency
bugs, atomicity violations are studied in recent works [44, 57, 4]. This paper presents
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a tool based on McPatom [7] using model checking to predict atomicity violation
distributed concurrency bugs, in the microservice based modern distributed systems.
The tool is powerful and it is able to capture runtime trace of shared resources
and infer the correlation between shared resources. The tool can explore a vast
interleaving space of a microservice based modern distributed system given a small
set of captured test runs. It is applicable to large real-world systems and predicts
an atomicity violation in a popular open source project.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
This dissertation presents methods and tools for modeling and analyzing concur-
rent software systems that run as multi-threaded programs or microservice based
distributed systems, to predict atomicity violation bugs and improve the reliability
of concurrent software. For multi-threaded programs, we use binary instrumenta-
tion tool to capture runtime information about shared variables and synchroniza-
tion events, and for microservice based distributed systems, we use a web proxy
to capture HTTP based traﬃc about API calls and the shared resources they ac-
cess including distributed locks. Based on the capture traces, we develop methods
to extract a partial order model and apply model checking techniques by deﬁn-
ing the atomicity violation patterns in LTL formulas. We also develop methods
to infer the correlation between shared variables in multi-threaded programs and
shared resources in microservice based distributed systems and deﬁne patterns for
multi-variable atomicity violation.
Our tool using model checking to predict atomicity violation concurrency bugs is
powerful and can explore a vast interleaving space of non-deterministic programs in-
cluding multi-threaded programs and microservice based distributed systems, given
a small set of captured test runs. Our tool is applicable to large real-world systems.
The experiment result shows the scalability of our methods is promising compared
to related works and our methods are able to detect well-known atomicity violations
in multi-threaded programs and also discover a couple of new atomicity violations
in real-world microservice based distributed systems.
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5.2 Future Work
For the microservice based distributed systems, we predict atomicity violations and
present them in Petri net models. The Petri net models are small ones only covering
the relevant resources in a relevant pattern. Additional methods can be developed
based on existing process mining algorithms to give a larger Petri net model covering
more resources and better picture of the overall systems, that makes it possible
to do more analysis based on Petri net models. And the partial order process
model we deﬁne for microservice based distributed systems doesn't take barriers
into consideration as they are rarely used in microservice based distributed systems,
can be enhanced to add barriers to reduce false positives when barriers are used in
the microservice based distributed system.
We can also support the logging framework chosen by the authors of the mi-
croservice such as log4j and log4j2, to adapt to more distributed systems that might
have more complicated data design and not follow RESTful API and resource de-
sign. Using logging frameworks also make it more ﬂexible to get more information
between correlated variables and resources so that it can improve the conﬁdence
when inferring the correlation between them thus helping to ﬁnd the real atomicity
violations.
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